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Brand Fetishism 
KATYA ASSAF 
This Article focuses on “brand fetishism”—the phenomenon of 
perceiving trademarks as spiritual entities rather than as informational 
devices.  Modern corporations strive to create brands with personalities 
and souls, brands that tug at consumers’ heartstrings. Meanwhile, 
trademark law is intended to protect trademarks as informational tools 
reducing consumers’ search costs.  This Article examines this dissonance 
between trademark law rationales and the current use of the corporate 
trademark.  
Research demonstrates that emotional branding results in mistaken 
quality judgments and hinders rational purchasing decisions by 
consumers, thereby distorting market competition.  Therefore, this Article 
proposes that trademark law should serve to discourage brand fetishism, 
and should act to restore the original informative function of trademarks.  
Yet, as this Article demonstrates, trademark law in practice supports and 
encourages brand fetishism.  This Article surveys the various doctrines in 
trademark law that, deliberately or not, result in this undesirable outcome, 
and suggests subsequent changes. 
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Brand Fetishism 
KATYA ASSAF* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
“What’s in a name?  That which we call a rose 
By any other name would smell as sweet.”1 
Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet famously criticizes the human 
tendency to focus on a name or appearance, and to disregard substance.  
After discovering that Romeo is of Montague stock, and hence her sworn 
enemy, Juliet realizes that a name is a meaningless convention.  What 
matters is who someone actually is, and not what he is called.  Through his 
tragic story of star-crossed lovers, Shakespeare implies that humankind’s 
natural tendency toward superficiality should be resisted, because it causes 
irrational and harmful behavior.  To quote another common aphorism, one 
should not judge a book by its cover. 
In the world of trademarks too, there is sometimes a conflation 
between label and substance.  The primary purpose of trademark law has 
traditionally been to protect trademarks as labels, as tools enabling the 
consumer to identify products of various manufacturers.  That is, in the 
legal sense, a trademark is a name, a designation, and not the rose itself.  
Just as the word “rose” indicates a flower with certain characteristics, so 
too should a trademark indicate a product with a certain level of quality.  In 
practice, however, trademark owners often strive to elevate form over 
substance—the trademark over the physical products it signifies.  At times 
they succeed. 
For instance, consumers rate the taste of soda higher when it carries the 
name “Coca-Cola” than when it does not.2  Clothing tags have migrated 
from their hidden location inside the collar to the outside, grown 
exponentially in size, and transformed items of clothing into mere carriers 
                                                                                                                          
* Assistant Professor, Law School, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.  I would like to thank 
Michael Birnhack, David Enoch, Wendy Gordon, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Barak Medina, Neil W. 
Netanel, Michal Shur-Ofry, Alexei Soma, Rebecca Tushnet, Steven Wilf, Helena Zakowska-Henzler, 
and Eyal Zamir for their invaluable comments, insights, and suggestions. 
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2. 
2 See, e.g., Sanjoy Ghose & Oded Lowengart, Taste Test: Impact of Consumer Perceptions and 
Preferences on Brand Positioning Strategies, 10 J. TARGETING, MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS FOR 
MARKETING 26, 30 (2001) (“In a blind taste test, Diet Pepsi was preferred by 51 per cent of the 
subjects while Diet Coke was preferred by 44 per cent. . . . [A] branded taste test resulted in Diet Pepsi 
being preferred by 23 per cent with Diet Coke being preferred by 65 per cent.”). 
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of the brand they represent.3  And the Harley-Davidson brand has been 
described as being so powerful as to be “in effect, a religious icon around 
which an entire ideology of consumption is articulated.”4 
As early as 1942, Justice Frankfurter observed: “The protection of 
trade-marks is the law’s recognition of the psychological function of 
symbols.”5  Indeed, trademark law shines its spotlight on symbols, which 
at times carry with them strong psychological messages.  Much of 
marketing research focuses on various strategies for building strong 
brands—brands that represent coherent sets of values and ideals, brands 
that evoke a consumer’s feelings, and most importantly, brands that 
guarantee a consumer’s loyalty.6  Much of academic consumer research is 
dedicated to revealing how consumers perceive brands.7  
Although marketing and consumer research dealt directly with the 
subject of trademark protection, the legal literature has, for many years, 
largely ignored its insights.  Until recently, interdisciplinary research in 
trademark law has focused primarily on law and economics.  Only in the 
past few years have trademark scholars begun to venture into other 
disciplines.8  
Important as it may be, economic analysis provides little insight into 
the ways many successful trademarks function today.  Traditional 
economic analysis views trademarks as devices that provide product 
information and reduce consumer search costs.9  Yet, many consumers 
who are loyal to a certain brand of soft drinks or cigarettes, ostensibly 
because of the superior taste of the product, actually cannot distinguish 
their favorite brand in a blind taste-test.10  Moreover, consumer research 
                                                                                                                          
3 NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO 28 (2002).  
4 John W. Schouten & James H. McAlexander, Subcultures of Consumption: An Ethnography of 
the New Bikers, 22 J. CONSUMER RES. 43, 50 (1995). 
5 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
6 See infra Part II.B (discussing the emergence of brand fetishism). 
7 See infra notes 44–66 and accompanying text (discussing various conclusions about brand 
conception from academic research). 
8 See, e.g., Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1, 2–3 
(2008) (suggesting a semiotic model to examine several doctrines of trademark law); Barton Beebe, 
The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623–24 (2004) (applying tools of 
semiotics to trademark law); Thomas R. Lee et al., Sophistication, Bridging the Gap, and the 
Likelihood of Confusion: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 913, 914–15 
(2008) (using theoretical models from consumer psychology and an empirical study to examine the 
factors influencing consumer confusion); Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: 
Empirical Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 265, 265 (2000) 
(detailing an empirical study examining the psychological effects of trademark dilution and suggesting 
the adoption of cognitive science as a normative basis justifying anti-dilution protection); Jerre B. 
Swann, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Brand Strength, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 943, 945 (2006) (using 
consumer research to explain the extensive legal protection of strong marks).  A notable step forward in 
this context is LIONEL BENTLY ET AL., TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 
(2008) (suggesting various interdisciplinary perspectives on U.K. trademark law). 
9 See infra Part II.A (discussing the traditional view of trademarks). 
10 Ghose & Lowengart, supra note 2, at 30. 
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shows that brands are frequently imputed to have character traits.  Brands 
can even serve as viable relationship partners, and can evoke feelings of 
love and passion.11  Some brands, such as Apple and Harley-Davidson, 
have been found to serve as objects of cult and ritual.12  The existence of 
these phenomena, referred to collectively as “brand fetishism,” is 
inconsistent with the basic premises of traditional economic analysis of 
trademark law, which takes a purely functional view of the trademark. 
The tension between the trend toward brand fetishism and the 
economic analysis of trademark law has garnered scant attention from legal 
scholars.  This Article seeks to remedy this gap in the literature.  It first 
surveys data culled from the fields of marketing research and consumer 
research to provide insights into the phenomenon of brand fetishism.  The 
Article then argues that brand fetishism distorts the primary economic 
function of trademarks and hinders efficient market competition.  
Therefore, this Article suggests that trademark law should act to 
discourage this practice. 
In fact, brand fetishism enjoys extensive legal endorsement and 
encouragement.  As an illustration, let us consider brand extensions into 
far-flung product fields, a topic which this Article will revisit.  
Brand extensions are an extremely profitable commercial practice.13  
Marketing research has found that a brand is more extendible the more 
general its concept—that is, the less the concept is tied to a physical 
product.14  Brands closely associated with a product category, such as 
Campbell’s Soup, Chiquita, or Kleenex cannot be extended very far.15  By 
contrast, brands with a high imaginary content are hardly restrained by 
product areas.16  Thus, Harley-Davidson sells sunglasses, hair accessories, 
and underwear alongside its motorcycles; and Jaguar markets not only 
sports cars, but also perfume, lipstick, and body lotion.17 
In other words, ironically, trademarks with highly informative, 
                                                                                                                          
11 See infra notes 47–51, 62 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra text accompanying notes 64–67. 
13 Julie Manning Magid et al., Quantifying Brand Image: Empirical Evidence of Trademark 
Dilution, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 31–32 (2006). 
14 DAVID A. AAKER & ERICH JOACHIMSTHALER, BRAND LEADERSHIP 154–55 (2000); JESPER 
KUNDE, CORPORATE RELIGION 81 (2000); C. Whan Park et al., Evaluation of Brand Extensions: The 
Role of Product Feature Similarity and Brand Concept Consistency, 18 J. CONSUMER RES. 185, 192 
(1991). 
15 AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 154–55. 
16 Id.; Susan M. Broniarczyk & Joseph W. Alba, The Importance of the Brand in Brand 
Extension, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 214, 226–27 (1994); Mark S. Glynn & Roderick J. Brodie, The 
Importance of Brand-Specific Associations in Brand Extension: Further Empirical Results, 7 J.  
PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 509, 509 (1998); Park et al., supra note 14, at 192. 
17 See, e.g., JAG COLLECTION, http://www.jagcollection.co.uk/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2010) 
(selling items such as clothing, fragrances, and teddy bears); Motorclothes Merchandise, HARLEY-
DAVIDSON, http://www.harley-davidson.com/browse/browse_categories.jsp?asst=MotorClothes/ (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2010) (selling items such as sunglasses, accessories, and loungewear). 
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product-related content are less profitable in the current market economy.18  
In addition, to achieve the status of a leading brand, extensions are a 
necessity, rather than an option.  Extending a brand far from its primary 
product demonstrates that the brand can be detached from its specific 
product area and operate as an independent entity.  
Brand extensions into distant product fields, known as collateral 
markets, are thus an integral part of brand fetishism.  Yet, trademark law 
extensively supports and encourages this commercial practice.  Famous 
trademarks are protected today in virtually every product field.  For 
example, “Hallmark,” when used for an auto dealership, was found to 
infringe “Hallmark,” as applied to greeting cards,19 and owners of the 
“Lexus” automobile mark successfully sought injunction of the use of the 
mark on personal care products.20  
Moreover, trademark law privileges marks that have been extended 
into collateral markets by granting them stronger legal protection.  For 
instance, the mark “Harley-Hog” for pork was denied registration, because 
Harley-Davidson had used its marks for a wide variety of collateral 
products, including beer, wine coolers, chocolate bars, and more.  The 
court concluded that a consumer having knowledge of these brand 
extensions would conclude that “Harley-Hog” pork products originate 
from Harley-Davidson.21 
Meanwhile, when licensing their marks into collateral markets, 
trademark owners usually do not engage in quality control programs.  They 
have no expertise in these product fields and are not in a position to specify 
quality standards or to exercise meaningful quality control over their 
licensees.22  A trademark in collateral markets thus does not serve to 
provide product information and conserve consumer search costs—the 
trademark owner is not the origin of goods in any meaningful sense.  
Rather, the primary function of a trademark in such cases is merely to 
exploit its psychological influence on the consumer.  
Trademark licensors are often exempted from tort liability for 
defective products of their licensees in collateral markets.23  The legal 
system thus approves of the commercial practice of licensing the 
trademarked symbol as a mere trigger for purchase, without requiring the 
trademark owner to stand behind the licensed products in any meaningful 
way.  This amounts to an explicit endorsement of brand fetishism. 
                                                                                                                          
18 AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 154. 
19 Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 990, 998–99 (W.D. Mo. 1986).  
20 Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Natural Health Trends Corp., No. CV 04-9028 DSF (Ex), 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10442, at *16–17 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2005). 
21 Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Pierce Foods Corp., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 857, 863 (T.T.A.B. 
1986).  
22 See infra text accompanying note 302. 
23 See infra text accompanying notes 210–11. 
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As the example of collateral markets demonstrates, brand fetishism 
tends to strip trademarks of their informative content, transforming them 
into mere tools of psychological influence.  Therefore, by supporting brand 
fetishism, trademark law acts contrary to its fundamental economic 
rationales. 
After first arguing that brand fetishism—and its accompanying legal 
protection—distorts the primary economic function of trademarks, this 
Article examines whether there are alternative rationales for supporting 
brand fetishism.  For instance, some trademarks serve as social tools of 
interpersonal communication, and at times are even used to satisfy spiritual 
needs of the consumers.  Nonetheless, this Article demonstrates that these 
new functions of trademarks cannot provide an alternative basis for 
expanding legal protection.  
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the trend toward 
brand fetishism; Part III discusses how trademark law should react to this 
modern commercial reality; Part IV is dedicated to surveying the various 
mechanisms in trademark law that support and encourage brand fetishism; 
Part V examines whether there are alternative rationales for supporting 
brand fetishism; and finally, the conclusion suggests that trademark law 
should act to demystify brands and to restore their primary function—
indicating the product’s origin and quality. 
II.  BRAND FETISHISM 
A.  Background: Fetishism of Commodities and Trademark Law 
A “fetish” is an object believed to have magical or supernatural 
powers.24  “Fetishism” is the “veneration of objects believed to have 
magical or supernatural potency.”25  In 1867, Karl Marx borrowed this 
anthropological terminology to describe a phenomenon he famously 
entitled “fetishism of commodities.”  “Fetishism of commodities” is the 
state of affairs in a capitalist market, in which products are perceived as 
“commodities”—entities having an inherent value—whereas in fact their 
value is created by human labor.26  Marx argued that this mystification of 
commodities bears great similarity to the religious beliefs of primitive 
societies, in which objects produced by human labor appear as independent 
                                                                                                                          
24 THE HARPERCOLLINS DICTIONARY OF RELIGION 360 (Jonathan Z. Smith et al., eds., 1995). 
25 Fetishism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
205502/fetishism (last visited September 25, 2010). 
26 1 KARL MARX, CAPITAL 165 (Ben Fowkes trans., Penguin Classics 1990) (1867) (“There the 
products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which 
enters into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of commodities 
with the products of men’s hands.  I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of 
labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production 
of commodities.”). 
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beings endowed with life.27  This perception of commodities emerged in 
the late nineteenth century against the background of the late Industrial 
Revolution—the rise of mass mechanical production and rapid distribution 
disconnected the goods from their producers, or, in Marx’s terms, led to 
“alienation.”28  
At the same time, against the same economic backdrop, trademark law 
emerged in Europe and in the United States.29  In a market of goods 
detached from their producers, it was necessary to create a mechanism that 
would allow the consumer to identify and distinguish the products of 
various manufacturers.30  Thus trademark law was born to protect 
trademarks as indications of the origin of goods.  In their early years, 
trademarks were thought to represent the physical source of manufacture.  
Under this “source theory,” trademark licensing and assignment were 
viewed as philosophically impossible without the transfer of the entire 
business.31  The “source theory” accorded with the commodity fetishism of 
Marx’s times: a trademark indicated the owner of the factory as the 
meaningful source of the products, obscuring and devaluating the labor of 
the workers that stood behind these products. 
In the late 1910s, courts began to gradually soften the “source theory,” 
recognizing the possibility of licensing and selling trademarks without 
transferring the entire business.  The new approach claimed that a 
trademark should connote a “single, albeit anonymous source.”32  That is, a 
trademark should not necessarily indicate the physical origin of the goods; 
it should solely communicate the message that all goods carrying the mark 
                                                                                                                          
27 Id. at 163–65. 
28 Id. at 203–04. 
29 The first volume of Capital was published in 1867.  Some of the first trademark laws were 
passed around the same time.  For example, in the United Kingdom, the Trade Mark Registration Act 
was passed in 1875, Bass Feels a Bitter Draught, INDEP. (London), Sept. 27, 1998, at 30; in France, the 
Manufacture and Goods Mark Act was enacted in 1857, The IP Guide to . . . France, NEW LEGAL 
REV., (Oct. 24, 2006), http://www.cpaglobal.com/newlegalreview/1175/the_ip_guide_to_france; and in 
the United States, the Federal Trade Mark Act was enacted in 1870, Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 
Stat. 198.  The Federal Trade Mark Act was held unconstitutional in 1879.  In re Trade-Mark Cases, 
100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879).  
30 See Patricia K. Fletcher, Comment, Joint Registration of Trademarks and the Economic Value 
of a Trademark System, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 297, 302 (1982) (“From the English middle ages . . . 
through the nineteenth century, local businesses dominated the marketplace.  The consumer and 
manufacturer were in close proximity.  Thus, the consumer was familiar with the identity, size, 
location, and reputation of the local manufacturers from which he bought goods. . . . The technological 
advances of the industrial revolution, particularly in communication and transportation, caused the 
consumer and manufacturer to become distant. . . . The consumer no longer knew the identity of the 
producer of goods, and manufacturers recognized the resulting necessity of trademark use as a means 
of distinguishing their goods from those of competitors.” (footnotes omitted)). 
31 E.g., Am. Broad. Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1941); MacMahan Pharmacal 
Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474–75 (8th Cir. 1901); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:39 (3d ed. 1992). 
32 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, id. § 3:9. 
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are somehow linked with or sponsored by a single corporation.33  This 
view was later complemented by the “quality theory”: beginning in the 
1930s, courts and legal scholars increasingly recognized that the most 
important function of a trademark is not its ability to denote the physical 
origin of goods, but its ability to indicate that all goods bearing the same 
mark have the same attributes and the same quality.34  In other words, the 
consumer does not care about the physical origin of goods, as long as the 
quality of the goods is consistent.  The “anonymous source theory” and the 
“quality theory” were codified into trademark law with the passage of the 
Lanham Act in 1946.35 
The “anonymous source theory” and the “quality theory” advanced 
commodity fetishism into a level unimaginable in Marx’s time.  The 
“anonymous source theory” transformed the source of the product into an 
extremely abstract and amorphous concept, whereas the “quality theory” 
affirmed that the real, physical source of manufacture was an entirely 
insignificant aspect of the product.  That is, trademark law explicitly 
recognized that a consumer should not be concerned with whether the 
sneakers she buys were produced by a well-paid American worker laboring 
under high standard working conditions or by a child subject to labor abuse 
in a Vietnamese sweatshop.  As long as the trademark tells her it is a Nike 
sneaker, she can assume that the sneaker is somehow linked with or 
sponsored by the same corporation as other Nike sneakers.  Thus, she can 
expect consistent quality, which is legally regarded as the only significant 
concern for her. 
It is important to note that absent the development of the “anonymous 
source theory” and the “quality theory” in trademark law, this high level of 
commodity fetishism would have been impossible.  Thus, trademark law 
was an essential tool that allowed the public perception of a product as a 
commodity—an object in its own right, independent from the human labor 
that created it—to reach its epitome. 
B.  The Emergence of Brand Fetishism 
Since the invention of the “anonymous source theory” and the “quality 
theory,” trademarks have advanced further along the fetishistic scale.  
                                                                                                                          
33 Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 962–63 (2d Cir. 1918); Manhattan 
Shirt Co. v. Sarnoff-Irving Hat Stores, Inc., 164 A. 246, 250 (Del. Ch. 1933); MCCARTHY, supra note 
31, § 3:9. 
34 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, §§ 3:10, 18:40.  
35 Lanham Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1051–1127 (1946)); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006) (stating that a mark may be used legitimately by 
“related companies” and such use shall not affect the validity of the mark); id. § 1127 (defining a 
“related company” as “any person whose use of a mark is controlled by the owner of the mark with 
respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is 
used”). 
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The twentieth century saw a plethora of technological developments, 
resulting in an enormous growth of mass production.  The Western 
economy seemed to finally have reached its ultimate goal of satisfying the 
material needs of the great majority of the population.36  Nevertheless, 
production remained the central measure of progress and national welfare, 
and constant market growth became the mythical aspiration of the modern 
economy.37  To achieve this goal, demand had to grow constantly as well.  
Hence, starting in the 1920s, corporations gradually shifted their attention 
and resources from the production of material goods to the production of 
consumer desires.38  The need to inspire imagination and provoke emotions 
in order to sell mass-produced products became common wisdom.39 
Trademarks, as mere indications of product quality, could no longer 
survive in this new commercial reality.  At this point, they evolved into 
brands.40  Brands were the platforms employed to attach feelings and 
images to physical commodities.  They were the primary means of 
establishing emotional bonds and loyalty relationships with consumers in a 
market saturated with goods.41  Brands extended the products, adding 
symbolic dimensions to the physical items.42  However, as suggestive 
marketing became widespread, emotion-laden brands became 
                                                                                                                          
36 See KALLE LASN, CULTURE JAM 59 (1999) (arguing that in the postwar years the American 
Dream seemed to have been achieved: a chicken in every pot, a car in every driveway); VANCE 
PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 21 (1957) (“One big and intimidating obstacle confronting the 
stimulators was the fact that most Americans already possessed perfectly usable stoves, cars, TV sets, 
clothes, etc.”). 
37 See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE CONSUMER SOCIETY: MYTHS AND STRUCTURES 41–42 (1998) 
(suggesting that productivity has the social function of a myth; comparing production and growth to 
black magic); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 102–03 (1958) (discussing the 
reduction in risk that accompanies the growth of the modern corporation). 
38 See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, CON$UMED: HOW MARKETS CORRUPT CHILDREN, INFANTILIZE 
ADULTS, AND SWALLOW CITIZENS WHOLE 177–78 (2007) (describing the transition of capitalism 
“from a system that serviced wants to a system that produced wants”); GALBRAITH, supra note 37, at 
127 (arguing that corporations create consumers’ desires for the goods they produce); PACKARD, supra 
note 36, at 22 (quoting an ad executive as saying “[w]hat makes this country great is the creation of 
wants and desires, the creation of dissatisfaction with the old and outmoded”).  
39 See, e.g., Douglas B. Holt, Why Do Brands Cause Trouble? A Dialectical Theory of Consumer 
Culture and Branding, 29 J. CONSUMER RES. 70, 87 (2002) (“Brands that create worlds that strike 
consumers’ imaginations, that inspire and provoke and stimulate, that help them interpret the world that 
surrounds them, will earn kudos and profits.”); Craig J. Thompson et al., Emotional Branding and the 
Strategic Value of the Doppelgänger Brand Image, 70 J. MARKETING 50, 50 (2006) (“Over the past 
decade, emotional branding has emerged as a highly influential brand management paradigm.”). 
40 See BARBER, supra note 38, at 177–78 (“Trademarks were only a way station on the road to 
brands, however.  For trademarks still hued fairly closely to generic products and services and would 
prove insufficient to the task of awakening desires . . . .  Brands were born . . . .”); KEVIN ROBERTS, 
LOVEMARKS: THE FUTURE BEYOND BRANDS 29–30 (2006) (“Brands were developed to create 
differences for products that were in danger of becoming as hard to tell apart as chunks of gravel.”).   
41 BARBER, supra note 38, at 178–79 (“Where trademarks traded in generic goods, brands traded 
in generic sentiments, emotions which had little to do with the goods and services themselves but were 
surgically attached to them by professional market doctors.”).  
42 See Burleigh B. Gardner & Sidney J. Levy, The Product and the Brand, HARV. BUS. REV., 
Mar.–Apr. 1955, at 33, 35 (asserting that a brand has a “public image,” which plays an important role 
in purchasing decisions). 
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commonplace as well.  Faced with fierce image competition, brands could 
no longer sustain consumer loyalty.43  By the 1980s, brands were in serious 
trouble.44 
At that time, new marketing concepts began to emerge.  Marketing 
experts increasingly recognized that a brand should represent a consistent 
set of values and ideals, rather than vague emotions and associations.  
Advertising executives started talking about the need to create a “brand 
identity,” “brand personality,” “brand character,” “brand DNA,” “brand 
equity,” and most dramatically, “brand soul.”45  Today it is already a 
widely accepted notion in marketing literature that a brand should resemble 
a human being, complete with a distinctive and coherent set of 
characteristics.46  
Research has found that consumer satisfaction is not a predictor of 
consumer loyalty and that the correlation between satisfaction and loyalty 
is very weak.47  Customers are much more loyal to a brand when their 
loyalty is based not on rational reasoning, but on emotional preference.48  
A consumer who considers factors such as product quality, when 
preferring one brand over another, is more likely than an emotionally 
attached consumer to switch brands when these factors change.49  
Therefore, as marketing literature advises, loyalty is best achieved by 
creating quasi-personal relations between the consumer and the brand.50  
Consumer loyalty should be based on a strong emotional attachment, 
                                                                                                                          
43 See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 40, at 35–36 (describing brands as “running out of juice”).  
44 See KLEIN, supra note 3, at 12–15 (describing a sharp decline of brand loyalty and the 
emergence of “brand blindness” in the 1980s and 1990s). 
45 See, e.g., AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 7–11 (suggesting a new strategy for 
brand management, “brand leadership,” with one of the major tasks being to build a clear and elaborate 
brand identity and personality); JEAN-NOËL KAPFERER, STRATEGIC BRAND MANAGEMENT 42–48 
(1992) (developing the concept of “brand identity” with six facets: physique, personality, relationship, 
culture, reflection, and self-image); SAL RANDAZZO, MYTHMAKING ON MADISON AVENUE 17 (1993) 
(“The brand’s soul is its spiritual center . . . that defines the brand and permeates all other aspects of the 
brand.”); Tom Kelly, Brand Essence—Making Our Brands Last Longer, 5 J. BRAND MGMT. 390, 390–
91 (1998) (discussing brand “DNA”).  
46 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Aaker, Dimensions of Brand Personality, 34 J. MARKETING RES. 347, 
347–48 (1997) (developing a framework of brand personality dimensions). 
47 KEKI R. BHOTE, BEYOND CUSTOMER SATISFACTION TO CUSTOMER LOYALTY 30–32 (1996). 
48 See C.N. Allen, A Psychology of Motivation for Advertisers, 25 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 378, 383 
(1941) (describing the futility of rationalizing an emotional brand choice); Amitai Etzioni, How 
Rational We?, 2 SOC. F. 1, 10 (1987) (“Brand loyalty is another phenomenon that suggests non-rational 
commitment: people buy products to which they develop a commitment even in face of evidence that 
the products are no longer the ‘best buy.’”). 
49 Assaf, supra note 8, at 68–69. 
50 MARC GOBÉ, EMOTIONAL BRANDING: THE NEW PARADIGM FOR CONNECTING BRANDS TO 
PEOPLE xiv–xv, xxvii–xxxii (2001) (“Emotional Branding is the conduit by which people connect 
subliminally with companies and their products in an emotionally profound way.”); DARYL TRAVIS, 
EMOTIONAL BRANDING: HOW SUCCESSFUL BRANDS GAIN THE IRRATIONAL EDGE 53–54 (2000) (“A 
transaction is like a one-night stand, and it’s never going to be as satisfying or rewarding as falling in 
love.  A transaction makes the cash register ring once.  A relationship makes it ring again and again.”); 
Thompson et al., supra note 39, at 51 (“Thus, the strategic objective of emotional branding is to forge 
strong and meaningful affective bonds with consumers.”). 
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preferably feelings of love, towards the brand.51  Marketing expert Kevin 
Roberts contends that a consumer’s love toward the brand renders loyalty 
beyond reason.52  A related vein of marketing research suggests that brand 
strategists should unearth the values and ideals that consumers strive to 
fulfill, and then imbue their brand with these values and ideals.53  The 
brand should provide the consumer with a means of self-expression, self-
identification, and self-actualization; it should serve as a conduit for the 
consumer to create her own lifestyle.54 
A relatively recent trend in marketing literature goes so far as to 
encourage corporations to create “brand cults,”55 “brand communities,”56 
and “brand religion.”57  Brand cults and brand communities are believed to 
breed consumer loyalty in its strongest form, to inspire religious-like 
devotion.58 
Corresponding studies in the field of consumer research demonstrate 
that marketing experts were not unsuccessful in their missions.  People can 
recognize “brand personalities”: they attribute values and ideals to 
commercial products represented by brands.59  Thus, a soft drink can 
represent noble ideals such as tolerance and open-mindedness.60  Brands 
are believed to have traits and character, distinct from those of the 
corporate management; brand devotees sometimes even complain that the 
corporation does not have a proper understanding of its own brand.61  
                                                                                                                          
51 ROBERTS, supra note 40, at 56–57 (“I became convinced that only an emotion like Love could 
power the next evolution of branding.”); TRAVIS, supra note 50, at 53–54. 
52 ROBERTS, supra note 40, at 66.  
53 DOUGLAS B. HOLT, HOW BRANDS BECOME ICONS: THE PRINCIPLES OF CULTURAL BRANDING 
3–4 (2004) (“Acting as vessels of self-expression, the brands are imbued with stories that consumers 
find valuable in constructing their identities.”); Holt, supra note 39, at 80 (“One of the first branding 
gurus, Earnest Elmo Calkins, developed the idea that manufacturers should strive to position their 
brands as concrete expressions of valued social and moral ideals.”). 
54 See, e.g., HOLT, supra note 53, at 3–4; Ian Phau & Kong Cheen Lau, Conceptualizing Brand 
Personality: A Review and Research Propositions, 9 J. TARGETING, MEASUREMENT & ANALYSIS FOR 
MARKETING 52, 52 (2000) (“Brands are perceived to possess a personality that consumers use as an 
avenue for self-expression . . . .”); Thompson et al., supra note 39, at 51 (“[B]rand strategists should 
focus on telling stories that inspire and captivate consumers.  These stories must demonstrate a genuine 
understanding of consumers’ lifestyles, dreams, and goals and compellingly represent how the brand 
can enrich their lives.”). 
55 DOUGLAS ATKIN, THE CULTING OF BRANDS 106–10 (2004). 
56 Id. at 58; James H. McAlexander et al., Building Brand Community, 66 J. MARKETING 38, 38 
(2002). 
57 KUNDE, supra note 14, at 47–95. 
58 ATKIN, supra note 55, at 67–73; McAlexander et al., supra note 56, at 43–51; Albert M. Muñiz, 
Jr. & Thomas C. O’Guinn, Brand Community, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 412, 427 (2001). 
59 ATKIN, supra note 55, at 106–10 (describing an experiment in which people were divided into 
groups according to their favorite brands of soft drinks and asked to write manifestos for their brands; 
the manifestos clearly articulated a well-differentiated worldview for the brands). 
60 Id. at 108 (noting that SoBe drinkers mentioned these ideals as part of the value system of the 
brand).  
61 Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra note 58, at 424 (noting that members of the Saab and Apple brand 
communities “often feel that they have a better understanding of the brand than the manufacturer 
does”).  For a most extreme example of this phenomenon, see Albert M. Muñiz, Jr. & Hope Jensen 
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Research shows that brands can serve as viable relationship partners for 
consumers.  Relations between consumers and brands are characterized in 
terms of intimacy, interdependence, commitment, love, and passion.62 
Several studies confirm that consumers incorporate brands into their 
lives as tools for shaping and expressing their own identities, and for 
perceiving the identities of others.63  Some brands even serve as objects of 
cults and rituals, and their followers form “brand communities”; Apple, 
Saab, Bronco, and Harley-Davidson are the most prominent examples.64  
Mac users and Saab drivers regard brand community members who switch 
brands as having “betrayed the brotherhood.”65  The Harley-Davidson 
brand has been described as being so powerful as to be “in effect, a 
religious icon around which an entire ideology of consumption is 
articulated.”66  Many Harley-Davidson devotees even tattoo the revered 
logo onto their bodies.67 
As this Article proceeds, the term “brand fetishism” will be used to 
signify the phenomenon described above: brand fetishism refers to the 
trend of accepting brands as spiritual beings, which can possess 
personalities and human characteristics, embed ideals and values, serve as 
                                                                                                                          
Schau, Religiosity in the Abandoned Apple Newton Brand Community, 31 J. CONSUMER RES. 737 
(2005) (exploring a brand community centered on the Apple Newton, a product that was abandoned by 
its manufacturer). 
62 Noël Albert et al., When Consumers Love Their Brands: Exploring the Concept and Its 
Dimensions, 61 J. BUS. RES. 1062, 1063 (2008) (detailing empirical research which examines the 
feelings of love toward brands); Susan Fournier, Consumers and Their Brands: Developing 
Relationship Theory in Consumer Research, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 343 (1998) (describing an empirical 
and theoretical study developing a comprehensive framework for characterizing consumer-brand 
relationships). 
63 Russell W. Belk et al., The Sacred and the Profane in Consumer Behavior: Theodicy on the 
Odyssey, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 1, 15 (1989) (noting that Chevrolet devotees characterize themselves as 
“Chevy people,” as opposed to “Ford” people); Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra note 58, at 420, 423 
(describing how Macintosh users feel superior to the “IBM herd”); Ronald W. Pimentel & Kristy E. 
Reynolds, A Model for Consumer Devotion: Affective Commitment with Proactive Sustaining 
Behaviors, ACAD. MARKETING SCI. REV., 2004, at 1, 24, available at 
http://www.amsreview.org/articles/pimentel05-2004.pdf (“[C]onsumers report that their own values are 
similar to the perceived values of the brand . . . .”). 
64 Søren Askegaard, Brands as a Global Ideoscape, in BRAND CULTURE 91, 94–96 (Jonathan E. 
Schroeder & Miriam Salzer-Mörling eds., 2006) (discussing brand communities, noting that brands are 
taking on religious dimensions); Jonathan M.T. Balmer, Corporate Brand Cultures and Communities, 
in BRAND CULTURE, supra, at 34, 39 (asserting that brand communities are similar to faith groups); 
Robert V. Kozinets, Utopian Enterprise: Articulating the Meanings of Star Trek’s Culture of 
Consumption, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 67, 68 (2001) (discussing the Star Trek brand community); 
McAlexander et al., supra note 56, at 38 (describing Jeep and Harley Davidson brand communities); 
Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra note 58, at 412 (describing the brand communities centered around Ford 
Bronco, Macintosh, and Saab); Muñiz & Schau, supra note 61, at 737 (describing the Apple Newton 
brand community). 
65 Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra note 58, at 424–25. 
66 Schouten & McAlexander, supra note 4, at 53; see also MARTIN LINDSTROM, BUY-OLOGY: 
TRUTH AND LIES ABOUT WHY WE BUY 123–26 (2008) (describing a brain scan study, which 
demonstrated that brands such as Coca-Cola, Harley-Davidson, and iPod generate similar emotions to 
those inspired by religious symbols). 
67 MATT HAIG, BRAND FAILURES 78 (2003). 
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relationship partners, and provide sources of ritual and community. 
C.  Brand Fetishism Deepens 
As time went on, marketing experts came to believe that the emotional 
dimension of a commodity is not merely an additional feature that 
differentiates the core product from its counterparts and enhances its value.  
They came to believe that the emotional dimension is actually more 
important than the product itself.68  Marketing literature suggests that in the 
modern market, products have little material differences;69 many 
companies can produce good products,70 and almost any innovative 
product has cheaper imitations.71  Therefore, as marketing experts advise, 
corporations should move beyond product benefits and think about the 
meaning system their brands represent.72  Commodity competition—that 
is, competition based on material product differences—and price 
competition are regarded as worst case scenarios for a corporation.73  The 
prevalent marketing literature asserts that the only alternative is to build 
strong brands, brands that offer an opportunity to charge premium prices 
without offering superior products.74 
Many successful corporations increasingly view products as means of 
entering the market of spiritual, symbolic competition.75  Nike CEO Phil 
Knight stated:  
For years, we thought of ourselves as a production-
oriented company, meaning we put all our emphasis on 
designing and manufacturing the product.  But now we 
                                                                                                                          
68 GOBÉ, supra note 50, at xiv (“I believe that it is the emotional aspect of products . . . that will 
be the key difference between consumers’ ultimate choice and the price that they will pay.”); KLEIN, 
supra note 3, at 21 (“In the new model . . . the product always takes a back seat to the real product, the 
brand.”); KUNDE, supra note 14, at 2–3, 9–10, 48–49 (“Emotional values are replacing physical 
attributes as the fundamental market influence.”). 
69 ATKIN, supra note 55, at xii, 96; LINDSTROM, supra note 66, at 122 (“Once, when visiting a 
factory in China, I discovered that the factory tables were packed with one brand of clothing in the 
morning, another brand in the afternoon.  The only difference: the cotton logo, which, as a finishing 
touch, workers placed carefully on each shirt, sweater, and hoodie, creating the sole, and staggering, 
price differential between branded shirts and unbranded ones.”). 
70 KUNDE, supra note 14, at 109. 
71 ATKIN, supra note 55, at 96. 
72 Id. at 119; KUNDE, supra note 14, at 130. 
73 AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 14–16 (suggesting that the only option for a 
corporation in the face of price competition is to build brands); KLEIN, supra note 3, at 14 (describing 
the annual meeting of the U.S. Association of National Advertisers in 1988, during which the chairman 
berated the assembled executives for stopping to participate in “a commodity marketplace” rather than 
an image-based one); ROBERTS, supra note 40, at 29–30 (“For anyone in business, the rapid cycling of 
their valued products into generic stuff is a dark and constant fear.”). 
74 AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 14–16; ATKIN, supra note 55, at 109–10 
(arguing that brands can be “an opportunity to charge a premium without relying on the vicissitudes of 
product superiority”). 
75 See ATKIN, supra note 55, at 96 (discussing how corporations build meaning around their 
brands). 
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understand that the most important thing we do is market 
the product.  We’ve come around to saying that Nike is a 
marketing-oriented company, and the product is our most 
important marketing tool.76  
Marketing consultant Douglas Atkin explains that every company has the 
opportunity to gain strong brand loyalty, even if its product is not 
especially competitive—“just remember that emotional attachment trumps 
rational analysis.”77  The success of the iPod can illustrate this argument.  
When designing the iPod, Apple merely replicated already-existing 
technology, but its very successful marketing campaign led Apple to 
market dominance, while the pioneering companies have faded into 
oblivion.78 
To a certain extent, we already live in a symbolic economy, where the 
illusory spirit of the brand is valued higher than the physical products.  
Strong brands are often valued at many times above the book value of the 
corporations that own them.79  Many successful corporations, such as 
Tommy Hilfiger and Nike, largely leave the task of manufacturing 
products to other companies, and concentrate all their efforts on the most 
important task—creating and maintaining strong brands.80  As Naomi 
Klein notes,  
Tommy Hilfiger . . . is less in the business of 
manufacturing clothes than he is in the business of signing 
his name.  The company is run entirely through licensing 
agreements, with Hilfiger commissioning all its products 
from a group of other companies: Jockey International 
makes Hilfiger underwear, Pepe Jeans London makes 
Hilfiger jeans, Oxford Industries make Tommy shirts, the 
Stride Rite Corporation makes its footwear.  What does 
Tommy Hilfiger manufacture?  Nothing at all.81  
Often the reality behind the brand is less important than the illusory 
world it embodies.  For example, the Volvo brand may connote Sweden, 
though Volvo cars are exclusively manufactured by the American 
company, Ford.82  Ben & Jerry’s ice cream may suggest environmental and 
                                                                                                                          
76 BARBER, supra note 38, at 179. 
77 ATKIN, supra note 55, at 202; see also KUNDE, supra note 14, at 52 (making a similar 
argument).  
78 Ivan Abel, From Technology Imitation to Market Dominance: The Case of iPod, 18 
COMPETITIVENESS REV. 257, 263–64 (2008). 
79 AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 18 (noting that BMW, Nike, Apple, and IKEA 
were found to have brand value over seventy-five percent of the firm’s market value); Balmer, supra 
note 64, at 38 (stating that, at the time of its buyout by Philip Morris, the Kraft mark was valued at six 
times more than the book value of the company that owned it); Magid et al., supra note 13, at 8–9 
(noting that over ninety percent of the value of the Coca-Cola Company is attributed to its marks). 
80 ATKIN, supra note 55, at 96, 119; KLEIN, supra note 3, at 24. 
81 KLEIN, supra note 3, at 28. 
82 Balmer, supra note 64, at 41–45. 
 98 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:83 
ethical values, though the company was acquired by the Unilever 
conglomerate, which does not have a strong pedigree in environmental or 
ethical concerns.83 
The symbolic dimension of consumption is growing ever more 
important.  It is ever easier to indicate the brand of one’s clothing, 
footwear, cars, drinks, etc.  Products and brands sometimes even change 
roles.  For instance, several clothing industry brands have increased the 
size of their labels exponentially; likewise, labels have migrated from their 
original inconspicuous location inside the collar to the outside of the 
garment, exposed to all and sundry.84  Brands, once merely a symbolic 
extension of products, become in such cases the essence, and the products 
become secondary, material extensions of the brands.85  Rather than 
identifying the product, conspicuously displayed brands have come to 
identify the consumer herself.86 
Two additional phenomena constitute an integral part of the tendency 
toward brand fetishism: brand extensions and brand merchandising.  These 
phenomena will be discussed in the following two sections. 
D.  Brand Extensions 
Corporations have long recognized that strong brands provide an 
opportunity for “extension”: a brand’s reputation can be exploited to 
launch new products.  The stronger brands became, the more corporations 
were tempted to extend them.  By the 1980s, when corporations began 
imbuing brands with personalities and souls,87 brand extensions turned into 
a guiding business strategy.  Over half of the new products introduced in 
that decade were extensions of existing brands.88  Since then, a growing 
body of marketing literature has emerged, trying to explore the enigma of 
successful brand extensions.89  If successful, a brand extension results not 
only in profits gained from the new product; it also enhances the value of 
                                                                                                                          
83 Id. at 45.  Unilever is a multi-national conglomerate that owns a great number of brands in 
various product fields, including Knorr, Lipton, Dove, Axe, and many others.  Our Brands, UNILEVER, 
http://www.unilever.com/brands/?WT.GNAV=Our_brands (last visited Sept. 25, 2010). 
84 KLEIN, supra note 3, at 28. 
85 BARBER, supra note 38, at 178–79; KLEIN, supra note 3, at 28; KUNDE, supra note 14, at 102; 
Askegaard, supra note 64, at 100. 
86 BARBER, supra note 38, at 194, 198; HOLT, supra note 53, at 3–4; Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra 
note 58, at 420. 
87 See supra Part II.B. 
88 Barbara Loken & Deborah Roedder John, Diluting Brand Beliefs: When Do Brand Extensions 
Have a Negative Impact?, 57 J. MARKETING 71, 71 (1993); Dennis A. Pitta & Lea Prevel Katsanis, 
Understanding Brand Equity for Successful Brand Extension, 12 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 51, 51 
(1995). 
89 See infra notes 92–95. 
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the core brand.90  A poor brand extension, however, will not only decrease 
demand for the new product, but can also dilute and damage the core 
brand.91 
During the 1980s and the early 1990s, researchers held a rather 
straightforward view of extensions: the greater the similarity between the 
core product of the brand and the newly-introduced product, the more 
likely the extension is to succeed.92  This seems to be intuitive.  The more 
similar the products, the more the consumer is likely to assume that the 
skill that stands behind the core product can be successfully applied to the 
new one.  
But, this approach hardly serves to explain reality, in which the 
extension of the Virgin brand from music to airlines and cola succeeded, 
whereas the extension of the Cadillac brand to a less expensive “Cimarron” 
car model failed.93  Hence, marketing studies have attempted to provide 
additional insights into the mysterious terrain of brand extensions.  A new 
strand of research draws upon Murphy and Medin’s theory on 
categorization thought94 as a framework for evaluating brand extensions.95   
According to this theory, people associate objects by categories.  A 
category is based on a mental concept that can be something other than 
object similarity.  Therefore, a mental category can tie together seemingly 
dissimilar objects.96  Applying this theory to the field of brand extensions, 
researchers concluded that what is most important for a successful 
extension is to understand the concept of the brand in the consumer’s 
mind—the extension should accord with this concept.97  Empirical 
                                                                                                                          
90 David A. Aaker & Kevin Lane Keller, Consumer Evaluations of Brand Extensions, 54 J. 
MARKETING 27, 27 (1990); Lorraine Sunde & Roderick J. Brodie, Consumer Evaluations of Brand 
Extensions: Further Empirical Results, 10 INT’L J. RES. MARKETING 47, 53 (1993). 
91 Loken & John, supra note 88, at 71; C. Whan Park et al., The Effects of Direct and Associative 
Brand Extension Strategies on Consumer Response to Brand Extensions, 20 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER 
RES. 28, 28–30 (1993).  
92 Aaker & Keller, supra note 90, at 27; David M. Boush & Barbara Loken, A Process-Tracing 
Study of Brand Extension Evaluation, 28 J. MARKETING RES. 16, 16 (1991); David M. Boush et al., 
Consumer Behavior Seminar, Univ. of Minn., Affect Generalization to Similar and Dissimilar Brand 
Extensions, 4 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 225, 226 (1987). 
93 Pitta & Katsanis, supra note 88, at 51 (“While the Cimarron was not actually a failure it did 
cast a shadow on the core product.  The model was popular in a market segment which could not afford 
luxury sized Cadillacs.  Owners of luxury sized models lost their sense of the car’s exclusivity.”). 
94 Gregory L. Murphy & Douglas L. Medin, The Role of Theories in Conceptual Coherence, 92 
PSYCHOL. REV. 289, 291–97 (1985). 
95 Subodh Bhat & Srinivas K. Reddy, Investigating the Dimensions of the Fit Between a Brand 
and Its Extension, in MARKETING THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, PROC. OF THE AM. MARKETING ASS’N 
WINTER EDUCATORS’ CONF. 186 (Debbie Thorne LeClair & Michael Hartline eds., 1997); Broniarczyk 
& Alba, supra note 16, at 215–16; Park et al., supra note 14, at 186. 
96 Murphy & Medin, supra note 94, at 289. 
97 See, e.g., Aaker & Keller, supra note 90, at 29 (“[T]he transfer of the perceived quality of a 
brand will be enhanced when the two product classes in some way fit together.”); Bhat & Reddy, supra 
note 95, at 186 (“Consumers’ view of a brand as a mental category and how this view affects extension 
evaluation seems to be, by far, the most popular explanatory framework used by extension 
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evidence shows that brand associations are a more influential factor for a 
successful extension than product similarity.98  An illustrative example is 
the failed attempt to extend the Heinz brand to cleaning vinegar.99  While 
the company already produced and sold vinegar, consumers perceived the 
Heinz brand as a brand of a food manufacturer and refused to accept its 
extension to a non-edible cleaning product.100 
Studies suggest a distinction between “prestige brands” and 
“functional brands.”  While functional brands are perceived in terms of 
product performance aspects, prestige brands are primarily perceived in 
terms of image.101  People employ different concepts when categorizing 
prestige brands and functional brands: though they readily identify 
common associations behind prestige brands of very different products, 
such as Mercedes and Lenox, they are not able to find any concept uniting 
functional brands of dissimilar products, such as Sony and Xerox.102  In the 
same vein, Benjamin Barber argues that Nike today competes with Disney 
rather than with Reebok.103 
Consequently, it was found that extensions of different brands are 
evaluated differently by consumers, depending on the concept behind the 
brand.  The more generic a brand concept is, the more extendible it is, and 
the less it is tied to a physical product.104  Brands closely tied to a product 
category, such as Campbell’s Soup, A-1 Steak Sauce, Kleenex, Clorox 
Bleach, or Chiquita, cannot be extended too far.105  For instance, Chiquita’s 
attempts to extend from bananas to juices failed twice.106  By contrast, 
consumers readily accept extensions of a prestige brand into very distant 
fields.107  Brands with high imaginary content, such as Harley-Davidson, 
Jaguar, Armani, and Virgin, are not restrained by product categories.108  
Thus, Harley-Davidson now sells sunglasses, hair accessories, and 
underwear; Jaguar markets perfume, lipstick, and body lotion; Armani has 
been extended from clothes to sunglasses, watches, jewelry, fragrance, and 
                                                                                                                          
researchers.”); Park et al., supra note 14, at 185 (presenting a study that examines the differences 
between successful and unsuccessful brand extensions). 
98 See Broniarczyk & Alba, supra note 16, at 226–27 (examining the results of a study that shows 
the importance of brand association versus category similiarity); Glynn & Brodie, supra note 16, at 509 
(describing the replication of the Broniarczyk & Alba study with supporting results). 
99 HAIG, supra note 67, at 87–89.  
100 Id. 
101 Park et al., supra note 14, at 186. 
102 Id. at 192. 
103 BARBER, supra note 38, at 178. 
104 AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 154–55; KUNDE, supra note 14, at 81; Park et 
al., supra note 14, at 186. 
105 AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 154–55; KUNDE, supra note 14, at 81; Park et 
al., supra note 14, at 186. 
106 HAIG, supra note 67, at 103–05. 
107 AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 154–55; Broniarczyk & Alba, supra note 16, at 
221–23; Glynn & Brodie, supra note 16, at 509. 
108 KUNDE, supra note 14, at 19. 
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even televisions; and Virgin has been extended from music to airlines, soft 
drinks, vodka, credit cards, and mobile phones.109 
Sometimes a brand is evaluated differently by different consumers.  
Consumers who have a “functional relationship” with a brand, that is, 
perceive it merely as a carrier of product information, respond more 
negatively to brand extensions than consumers who have an “emotional 
relationship” with the brand.110  
Ironically, trademarks with a high informative, product-related content 
are therefore less profitable in the current market economy.111  To be a 
leader brand is to communicate spirit and soul, rather than product-related 
skill and expertise.  Just as under the reign of the advanced commodity 
fetishism, trademarks ceased to identify the physical origin of manufacture 
and started indicating a single, albeit anonymous source in the era of brand 
fetishism, the most successful trademarks no longer connote product 
information, but a “distinct, albeit abstract, set of associations.”112 
What is more interesting, however, is that to achieve the status of a 
leading brand, extensions are no longer an option but a necessity.  If a 
brand sticks to one product category, it is likely to become a functional 
brand, no matter how much marketing was employed to create its spirit.  
Restriction to one product category may reduce the meaning of the brand 
to a simple identification of commodities.  Analyzing Levi’s decreasing 
market share, Jennifer Steinhauser notes: “Maybe one of Levi’s problems 
is that it has no cola.  It has no denim-toned house paint.  Levi makes what 
is essentially a commodity: blue jeans.  Its ads may evoke rugged 
outdoorsmanship, but Levi hasn’t promoted any particular life style to sell 
other products.”113  Brand extensions are indispensable to ensure that the 
brand conveys a larger concept than mere physical products—a concept 
that can be applied to diverse product areas.  A brand extension 
demonstrates that the brand can detach from its specific product area and 
operate as an independent entity. 
E.  Brand Merchandising 
Merchandising is the practice of licensing trademarks to be printed as 
decorative elements on T-shirts, posters, cups, and the like.  Astronomical 
sums are paid in merchandising agreements solely for the right to stamp 
                                                                                                                          
109 Christina Binkley, Like Our Sunglasses? Try Our Vodka! Brand Extensions Get Weirder, 
Risking Customer Confusion, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2007, at D1. 
110 AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 155. 
111 Id. at 154; see also KUNDE, supra note 14, at 63 (asserting that once a “Brand Religion” is 
created, the company can sell all sorts of products under its unified umbrella). 
112 Peter A. Dacin & Daniel C. Smith, The Effect of Brand Portfolio Characteristics on Consumer 
Evaluations of Brand Extensions, 31 J. MARKETING RES. 229, 231 (1994). 
113 Jennifer Steinhauer, Design for Living; That’s Not a Skim Latte. It’s a Way of Life, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at 5. 
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the brand name or logo on such goods.114  Royalties from merchandising 
licenses sometimes even exceed the income from the company’s sales.115 
Brand merchandising is connected to the trend whereby brands are 
becoming more easily recognizable.  Brand merchandise, however, is more 
than that; drinking a Coke or riding a Harley-Davidson motorcycle 
certainly has a symbolic dimension.  Hanging a Coca-Cola poster in one’s 
bedroom or wearing a Harley-Davidson T-shirt, however, has only a 
symbolic dimension.  Such activities demonstrate that some consumers 
have largely internalized the idea of brands as independent spiritual beings 
which can be liberated from any connection with material goods.  By 
wearing a brand T-shirt or hanging a brand poster, the consumer admits 
that he or she is no longer concerned with the product that the brand sells.  
In buying brand merchandising, he or she evokes the brand’s spirit without 
any product-related substance. 
This is not to say, however, that such a consumer will not purchase the 
core products of the brand; the converse is true.  In his classic book, David 
A. Aaker describes five levels of brand loyalty, the highest level being 
“committed consumer.”116  The ultimate “committed customer” is “the 
Harley-Davidson rider who wears the Harley symbol as a tattoo.”117  
Pimentel and Reynolds further suggest that “[t]he devoted consumer will 
display the brand logo on items from product categories different from that 
of the branded product, such as the logo of an automobile company on a T-
shirt.  They will seek opportunities to acquire and exhibit the logo—not 
necessarily in connection with consuming the product.”118  
Marketing literature regards consumers who buy brand merchandise as 
consumers who have reached the highest level of devotion to the brand, 
comparable to religious fervor.119  They feel attached to the brand and 
share its values so intensely that they are likely to remain loyal even in 
cases of poor product performance, scandal, bad publicity, and high 
prices.120 
Anthropological research provides additional insights to consumer 
behavior that explain why unconditional brand loyalty and the purchase of 
brand merchandise can be interconnected.  Social psychologists have 
                                                                                                                          
114 See, e.g., KUNDE, supra note 14, at 19 (noting that in 1994, Harley Davidson earned $256.5 
million from merchandising license agreements). 
115 Id. at 93–94 (“[T]here is far more money to be made in merchandising sales [of the Hard Rock 
Café] than in restaurant services.”). 
116 DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY: CAPITALIZING ON THE VALUE OF A BRAND 
NAME 39–41 (1991). 
117 Id. at 41. 
118 Pimentel & Reynolds, supra note 63, at 1; see also Kozinets, supra note 64, at 75–76 (noting 
that in a meeting of the Star Trek brand community, the members discussed whether they should be 
required to wear Star Trek uniforms to the community’s social functions). 
119 See Pimentel & Reynolds, supra note 63, at 1 (referring to brands that may take on aspects of 
the “sacred”). 
120 Id. 
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shown that “behavior can impact attitudes, opinions, and beliefs.”121  This 
can happen partly because we learn about ourselves by observing our own 
behavior (self-perception process).  It also can happen partly because, in 
trying to avoid psychological discomfort arising from behavior inconsistent 
with our attitudes, we are likely to change these attitudes (through the 
process of “cognitive dissonance”).122  In this way, rituals maintain and 
even create religious beliefs: since ritual performance is associated with 
these beliefs, self-perception or cognitive dissonance processes will cause 
non-believers to start believing and will strengthen the devotion of 
believers.  Research has shown that commitment to a religious group 
typically increases after some anticipated event, like prophecy, fails to 
occur.  To reconcile their behavior—performing religious rituals—with the 
new, seemingly contradictory, information, adherents claim greater belief 
and pursue the rituals with new passion.123  
Brand merchandise functions much in the same way as that of a 
religious ritual in its reinforcement of core beliefs.  The act of buying and 
displaying brand merchandise strengthens brand loyalty, making it more 
difficult for the consumer to challenge his or her attitude in the future.  
Consumers are thus likely to remain loyal even when the brand could 
otherwise have disappointed them. 
F.  An Intermediate Conclusion 
This first Part has demonstrated that to a certain extent, marketing 
experts have succeeded in disseminating brand fetishism.  Conspicuously 
displayed brands reveal that a brand sometimes triumphs over its product-
carrier.  Brand extensions into dissimilar product categories further show 
that today’s leading brands are often perceived in terms of abstract images 
rather than in terms of product-related expertise.  Consumers easily accept 
the ability of these brands to be detached from their primary product field 
and function as entities in their own right.  Brand merchandising reveals 
that some brands serve as objects of religious-like devotion.  At the same 
time, all of these phenomena are vital in maintaining and reinforcing brand 
fetishism. 
III.  TRADEMARK LAW AND BRAND FETISHISM 
A.  Setting the Scene  
Trademark law is built upon premises radically inconsistent with brand 
                                                                                                                          
121 Richard Sosis, Why Aren’t We All Hutterites? Costly Signaling Theory and Religious 
Behavior, 14 HUM. NATURE 91, 97 (2003). 
122 Id. at 97–98. 
123 Id. 
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fetishism.  In the legal world, trademarks are informational devices.124  
They serve as efficient means of communicating information about the 
source and quality of goods in an increasingly complex modern market.125  
The central economic justification for trademark protection is the “search 
costs” rationale—trademarks reduce consumer search costs, thus 
promoting overall economic efficiency.126  At the same time, trademarks 
allow their owners to benefit from the reputation of their goods, thus 
encouraging investment in the quality of these goods.127  
Underlying trademark law is the assumption that a trademark has no 
value in itself.  Its only significance lies in the goodwill it represents, i.e., a 
reputation for product quality.128  Consequently, one of the basic principles 
of trademark law is that a trademark is not a taboo—not every reproduction 
of a trademark is forbidden.  A trademark is infringed only if the 
unauthorized use is likely to confuse the consumer.129  Viewed in this light, 
trademark protection does not require firm justification.  In contrast to 
other intellectual property rights which impose high costs on society by 
temporarily hampering competition, such as patent rights or copyrights, 
trademark law contributes to market efficiency and imposes relatively few 
                                                                                                                          
124 See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 770–71 (1992) (“[T]he legal 
recognition of an inherently distinctive trademark or trade dress acknowledges the owner’s legitimate 
proprietary interest in its unique and valuable informational device . . . .”); William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987) (“[A] 
trademark conveys information that allows the consumer to say to himself, ‘I need not investigate the 
attributes of the brand I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me 
that the attributes are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.’”). 
125 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (1995) (defining a trademark 
as a “word, name, symbol, device, or other designation . . . used in a manner that identifies . . . goods or 
services and distinguishes them from the goods or services of others”); Benjamin G. Paster, 
Trademarks—Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551, 551–52 (1969) (arguing that in the 
increasingly complex commercial reality, trademarks became necessary tools used to identify the 
producers of the various products).  
126 See, e.g., Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental purpose 
of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of 
the particular source of particular goods.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 2:5 (“The point is that 
trademarks reduce the customer’s cost of acquiring information about products and services.”); Landes 
& Posner, supra note 124, at 270 (“The value of a trademark is the saving in search costs made possible 
by the information or reputation that the trademark conveys or embodies about the brand . . . .”). 
127 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (“[T]rademark] law helps 
assure a producer that it . . . will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a 
desirable product.  The law thereby ‘encourage[s] the production of quality products’ . . . .” (alteration 
in original)); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 168, 179 (2003) (“[A] firm with a valuable trademark will be reluctant 
to lower the quality of its brand . . . .  [The] legal protection of trademarks encourages the production of 
higher-quality products.”). 
128 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796, 806 (D. Del. 1920) (explaining that the 
“trade-mark is the expression . . . of part or all of the good will of the business . . . .  Separate from the 
good will of the business it identifies, [the trademark] is useless, valueless”); MCCARTHY, supra note 
31, § 2:15. 
129 Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (“When the mark is used in a way that 
does not deceive the public we see no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the 
truth.  It is not taboo.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:11. 
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costs.130 
Trademark law is based on the premise that a trademark is merely a 
name or signifier, whereas the substance is the product associated with the 
mark.  Brand fetishism, however, assumes the opposite: consumers should 
be trained to perceive trademarks as entities with independent value.131  
Whereas trademark law is premised on competition for the quality and 
prices of goods, modern marketing literature advises corporations to avoid 
this kind of competition.132  Whereas trademark law encourages 
corporations to invest in product quality, marketing experts instead advise 
corporations to focus on creating strong brands.133  This dichotomy raises a 
critical question: how should trademark law react to this new commercial 
reality? 
The trend toward brand fetishism began in the 1920s, when 
corporations started shifting their resources from production of goods to 
establishing strong brands through marketing.  In 1927, Frank Schechter 
published one of the most famous and influential articles on trademark law, 
The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, which argued that trademarks 
can no longer be regarded merely as the visible manifestation of the 
business goodwill.134  Schechter advocated that the value of a trademark 
lies not only in the quality of goods it represents, but also in its selling 
power and its psychological hold upon the public.135  He concluded that the 
preservation of this value should constitute the only rational basis for 
trademark protection.136 
Schechter’s article was written when enthusiasm for psychological 
advertising and other brand strategies was high.137  The article implicitly 
assumed that trademark law should reflect commercial reality: components 
that comprise the value of a trademark should be protected.  As trademarks 
move away from their primary function and become objects of fetish, 
                                                                                                                          
130 Nicola Bottero et al., The Extended Protection of “Strong” Trademarks, 11 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 265, 267 (2007) (“[W]hile other intellectual property rights . . . provide a mix of static 
costs and dynamic benefits . . . very few costs and no deadweight losses whatsoever are associated with 
trademark protection.”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting 
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1227 (2007) (“Trademark law . . . represents 
an affirmation of, rather than a departure from, the competitive model that drives the United States 
economy.  It is in this respect distinct from the rest of intellectual property (IP) law, which departs from 
the competitive norm in order to encourage investment in invention and creation.”). 
131 See supra Part II.B. 
132 See supra Part II.B. 
133 See supra Part II.B. 
134 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 818 
(1927). 
135 Id. at 831. 
136 Id. 
137 Robert G. Bone, A Skeptical View of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 11 INTELL. PROP. 
L. BULL. 187, 192 (2007).  
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scholars increasingly doubt this assumption.138  Nevertheless, Schechter’s 
view remains quite popular to this day; many scholars believe that as long 
as trademark owners invest vast resources in creating valuable brand 
personalities, their investment should be protected.139 
This approach, however, is circular, as brand personality would have 
no economic value were it not legally protected.140  If everyone could make 
unauthorized use of the spiritual dimension of another’s trademark, 
trademark owners could not internalize their investment in these 
dimensions.  Consequently, they would not have sufficient economic 
incentives to build up brands with personalities and souls.  The fact that 
corporations expend energy in creating spiritual dimensions to their 
trademarks should lead us to assume that these dimensions most probably 
enjoy legal protection. 
In the 1930s, the “anonymous source theory” and the “quality theory” 
of trademark law detached the trademark from the physical origin of 
goods, thereby advancing “commodity fetishism” to new heights.141  Much 
in the same way, we must expect that given the modern reality of brand 
fetishism, this practice must enjoy legal support.  Part IV below will 
expose the mechanisms in modern trademark law that result in the 
protection of spiritual dimensions of brands—and support brand fetishism.  
But first, the next section will examine whether trademark law may have 
good reasons to discourage brand fetishism. 
                                                                                                                          
138 See, e.g., id. (“The normative question, however, is why the law should protect a mark’s grip 
on consumers when that grip is due to factors other than information about the quality of the  
product . . . .”); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile Theory or Fait 
Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 484–85 (2005) (asserting that trademarks should not be protected 
against unauthorized use on merchandising, as “[t]he investment at issue in these cases is not 
investment in the quality of the underlying product . . . but investment in merchandising the brand 
itself”). 
139 See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:121 (noting that on the question of how to quantify 
dilution damages, “a marketing or advertising expert could testify that in her opinion, the famous mark 
will in fact lose some of its selling power”); Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity in 
Federal Dilution Legislation Part II, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 5, 31–32 (2000) 
(suggesting that trademarks should be granted protection akin to the right of publicity); Magid et al., 
supra note 13, at 32 (“Decreased brand image should be the focus of determining whether, and the 
extent to which, a trademark risks dilution.”);  Ellen P. Winner, Right of Identity: Right of Publicity and 
Protection for a Trademark’s “Persona,” 71 TRADEMARK REP. 193, 196–97 (1981) (suggesting that 
trademarks should be granted protection akin to the right of publicity). 
140 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809, 815 (1935) (“The vicious circle inherent in this reasoning is plain.  It purports to base legal 
protection upon economic value, when, as a matter of actual fact, the economic value of a sales device 
depends upon the extent to which it will be legally protected.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham 
Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1709 (1999) (“[I]t does not follow that 
because something is valuable it must be owned.”); see also Assaf, supra note 8, at 75 (“It cannot be 
argued that the property right of the trademark owner is the right to protect the economic value of the 
trademark, since its value is the outcome of the legal protection.”). 
141 See supra Part II.A. 
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B.  Why Should Brand Fetishism Be Discouraged? 
The most compelling argument in favor of protecting brand 
personalities was articulated by Jay Dratler:  
The free-market philosophy that undergirds all economic 
law in the United States is based upon consumers’ 
sovereignty and free choice.  Under the famous 
“nondiscrimination” principle . . . consumers’ free choice in 
the marketplace, not the predilections of any elite . . . 
determines the value of products and services for purposes of 
economic law, including trade symbol law.  Widespread use 
of trade symbols as general “brand” identifiers, rather than as 
markers of particular products or services . . . appears to have 
been beneficial . . . to consumers . . . .142   
Put differently, although trademark law was initially intended to 
protect consumer choices based on quality and price, if today’s consumer 
prefers to buy brand personalities rather than products, this is what the 
market should deliver.  
This approach reveals a major tension characterizing the current 
discourse on trademarks: the relationship between commercial reality and 
legal doctrines.  It is a truism that the legal system should react to 
commercial reality.  The question, however, is how it should react.  
Traditional economic analysis of trademark law perceives the consumer as 
a rational being seeking to satisfy his or her preferences and using 
trademarks as means of reducing her search costs.143  At the same time, 
marketing experts actively and systematically undermine the consumer’s 
mechanisms of rational thought.  They openly admit that marketing is 
aimed at creating emotional attachments, which ultimately triumph over 
rational analysis.144  Eventually, marketing efforts succeed, and turn some 
brands into tools of psychological influence, so that the brand stimulates 
the consumer emotionally to buy the product.  Then the legal conclusion is 
that consumers, purchasing branded products without any apparent 
functional reason, demonstrate that they are interested in brand 
personalities rather than in products.  If so, brand personality is what 
trademark law should protect.  Choosing this approach, trademark law 
ignores the commercial reality, rather than adjusting itself to it. 
The fact that consumer demand exists for brands with strong spiritual 
dimensions should not necessarily lead one to conclude that consumers are 
interested in these dimensions.  An emotionally attached consumer may be 
more loyal to a brand than a satisfied consumer, but that certainly does not 
                                                                                                                          
142 JAY DRATLER, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 11.03 (2008). 
143 See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra Part II.C. 
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mean that consumers wish to become emotionally attached to brands.  
Marketing experts simply wield certain features of human perception 
against the consumer. 
Empirical evidence shows that some consumers do not purchase brand 
personalities consciously.  Consumers often base their brand loyalty on a 
perceived high product quality,145 and sometimes refuse to admit that they 
are “in love” with a brand, although indirect evidence shows that this is 
precisely the case.146  Emotional attachment to the brand positively 
influences the consumer’s evaluation of product quality.147  For example, 
in the mid-1990s, Budweiser introduced its “Lizards” ad campaign, which 
significantly improved the image of the brand.  Although the products were 
not modified, consumers reported that the beer tasted better.148  On an 
interpersonal level, feelings of love encourage a biased, positive perception 
of the relationship partner, rendering comparisons with alternatives 
difficult.  The same is true when the partner is a brand.149  For example, 
Coca-Cola consistently fails in blind taste-tests when pitted against other 
soda brands, and yet its loyal customers persist in their belief that Coca-
Cola tastes the best.150  Similarly, experiments demonstrate that people rate 
the taste of beer and cigarettes much lower when they do not realize that 
they are exposed to their favorite brand.151 
Since emotional attachments to brands produce misperceptions of 
product quality, it cannot be said that all consumers, who are loyal to a 
certain brand in spite of lack of substantial quality advantages, consciously 
purchase the spiritual dimensions of these brands.  Many consumers are 
not interested in a love affair with a brand.  As Benjamin R. Barber notes,  
[m]arketing . . . hijacks authentic emotions and sentiments 
                                                                                                                          
145 Fournier, supra note 62, at 365 (“At the core, all strong brand relationships were rooted in 
beliefs about superior product performance.  Beliefs in the utilitarian functioning of the brand were 
sometimes bolstered by performance myths . . . that marked the brand as superior and irreplaceable and 
thus resistant to competitive attack.”); see also MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 3:4 (discussing brain scan 
studies with Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola, in which brand loyalty was found to override the original taste 
preferences of loyal consumers); Swann, supra note 8, at 948 (“When queried about why they buy 
brands such as Coca-Cola . . . or Mercedes-Benz, consumer responses typically reflect little insight into 
the appeal of brands.  ‘Coca-Cola tastes better than Pepsi,’ some will argue. . . .  ‘Mercedes-Benz is an 
incredibly well-engineered car; it will last forever.’  These reasons may or may not be true, but few 
consumers can reliably distinguish between brands of soft drinks, and most consumers in the United 
States keep their cars for only a few short years.”).   
146 Albert et al., supra note 62, at 1074 (“[T]he word ‘love’ is explicitly employed in the U.S. 
(declaration of love) whereas French consumers rather use ‘adore’ or ‘like’ when talking about the 
loved brand.”). 
147 Fournier, supra note 62, at 365 (“The intimacy [in consumer-brand relations] supports stability 
through biased perceptions of the partner . . . .”); Swann, supra note 8, at 948. 
148 HOLT, supra note 53, at 10. 
149 Fournier, supra note 62, at 364. 
150 See supra note 2; Swann, supra note 8, at 948. 
151 OTTO BLUME ET AL., WERBUNG FÜR MARKENARTIKEL 39–40 (1976) (available only in 
German); Katya Zakharov, The Scope of Protection of Trademark Image, 36 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. 
& COMPETITION L. 787, 788 (2005).  
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and employs them in wholly instrumental ways to sell 
products in which neither producers nor consumers otherwise 
are likely to have much interest and for which in any case 
there is little inherent demand. . . .  Although the marketers  
. . . are trying to invoke emotions in consumers, they 
themselves are acting rationally, employing a powerful form 
of instrumental reason—emotion rationally deployed in the 
name of profits.  The love affair with a brand is the 
responsibility of the marketing agents and not of the 
consumer.152 
The consumer is not perfectly rational.  Although no experiments have 
yet been conducted, I would venture to guess that a great number of 
consumers would reconsider their brand loyalty if presented with evidence 
that it does not adequately reflect their taste preferences.  Brands often 
cause consumers to “judge the book by its cover,” a behavior many of 
them would probably regard as irrational.  Brands evoking strong emotions 
hinder sober quality judgments and rational purchasing decisions.  This, in 
turn, distorts market competition.  The market currently provides greater 
incentives to invest in brand personalities than in products, although this 
does not necessarily reflect consumers’ preferences.  Many consumers 
would rather have brands play the role of the name, not the rose—that is, 
would rather have brands indicate products rather than be the product 
itself. 
Brand fetishism is the market condition under which corporations 
strive to charge premium prices without offering superior products.  It has 
led the market to an absurd situation, in which competition on product 
quality and prices—the type of competition that serves the most basic 
consumer interests—is considered the “worst case scenario.”153  These are 
good reasons for discouraging brand fetishism.  Trademark law should 
strive to restore “commodity” competition so that it again becomes 
commonplace.  The promotion of this kind of competition is the 
traditional—and, I believe, the only—rational basis of trademark law.  
All this notwithstanding, it is still hardly deniable that a significant 
number of consumers are quite conscious of the spiritual dimension of 
brands.  Some consumers purchase luxury brands as status symbols.  
Others engage in brand cults and rituals, thereby explicitly recognizing 
brands as spiritual beings.  It can be argued that although traditional 
economic rationales do not justify the protection of the spiritual 
dimensions of brands, these dimensions do fulfill important needs for some 
consumers and this should provide an alternative basis for their protection.  
                                                                                                                          
152 BARBER, supra note 38, at 182–84, 196–97. 
153 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 110 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:83 
This argument will be addressed (and rebutted) below, in Part V.  But first, 
Part IV will survey the various mechanisms within trademark law that 
support and encourage brand fetishism.  Throughout Part IV, it will be 
assumed that trademark law—if it wishes to remain true to its basic 
rationales—should discourage brand fetishism. 
IV.  HOW DOES TRADEMARK LAW SUPPORT BRAND FETISHISM? 
The discussion below is divided into three sections, each one analyzing 
legal rules relevant to a specific (potential) market of a trademark: Part A 
discusses the primary market of a trademark; Part B analyzes collateral 
markets; and Part C focuses on merchandising markets. 
A.  The Primary Market 
A trademark’s “primary market” refers to goods that belong to the 
trademark owner’s primary field of activity, and closely related goods. 
1.  The Quality Control Requirement 
Licensing a trademark for use in its primary market is known as 
“classical licensing.”154  Typically, a company that previously 
manufactured a particular product and established goodwill in its 
trademark, “outsources” the task of manufacturing to a licensee, who can 
perform this task more economically.155  On the one hand, licensing 
detaches the trademark from its source, thus necessarily impairing its 
informative function to a certain extent.156  On the other hand, the 
economic benefits of such licensing are obvious, given the advantages of 
economies of scale, as well as the cheaper human and natural resources 
available in foreign countries.157  To ensure that a licensed trademark 
continues to indicate a consistent quality of goods, the Lanham Act 
requires the licensor to exercise quality control over the licensee.158  
Licensing without quality control constitutes a so-called “naked license,” 
and results in the loss of trademark rights.159 
Judicial practice ascribes great importance to the requirement of 
quality control.  A trademark carries with it a message that its owner 
                                                                                                                          
154 David J. Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, Trademark Licensors and the Third 
Restatement of Torts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV.  671, 714 (1999) [hereinafter Franklyn, Apparent 
Manufacturer]. 
155 David J. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of Strict Tort Liability for Trademark 
Licensors, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12 (1998) [hereinafter Franklyn, Licensors]. 
156 Lisa H. Johnston, Drifting Toward Trademark Rights in Gross, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 19, 25 
(1995). 
157 Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 341, 348–49 (2007). 
158 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:40; 15 U.S.C. §§ 1055, 1127 (2006).  
159 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:48. 
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controls the quality of goods sold under the mark’s auspices.  Without such 
oversight, the goods sold under the mark are not “genuine.”160  Hence, an 
uncontrolled license is “inherently deceptive.”161  Quality control, it is 
commonly said, imposes an affirmative duty upon the trademark owner.162 
This rhetoric notwithstanding, the quality control requirement has 
never constituted a serious burden for trademark owners.  Throughout the 
history of the Lanham Act, courts have been extremely reluctant to accept 
naked license claims.163  Judges repeatedly hold that claims of naked 
license face a stringent burden of proof.164  They eagerly seek evidence of 
quality control, and seem to be willing to accept any sign of such 
control.165  For instance, several courts held that even a minimal control 
over the licensee can satisfy the requirement of the Lanham Act;166 others 
found that reliance on the licensee’s own quality control measures,167 or 
even reliance on the licensee’s general reputation suffices.168  In a number 
of decisions, even mere contractual provisions allowing quality control, 
without any evidence of actual control, were held to fulfill the quality 
control requirement.169  Almost every case dealing with an argument of 
naked license reiterates the strict rhetoric of the quality control 
                                                                                                                          
160 Id.  
161 Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 598 (9th Cir. 2002); 
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:48. 
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(“Judicial reluctance to consider the question of substantial actual control is a distinctive feature of 
cases decided since the Lanham Act.”). 
164 See, e.g., Doeblers’ Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812, 824 (3d Cir. 2006); Creative 
Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 548 (10th Cir. 2000); Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 
F.2d 1113, 1121 (5th Cir. 1991); Am. Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 624–25 (5th Cir. 
1963). 
165 Elizabeth C. Bannon, The Growing Risk of Self-Dilution, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 570, 577–79 
(1992); Calboli, supra note 157, at 366–67, 370–71. 
166 Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977); 
Hurricane Fence Co. v. A-1 Hurricane Fence Co., 468 F. Supp. 975, 989 (S.D. Ala. 1979). 
167 Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 1985), 
overruled on other grounds by Bellevue Manor Assocs. v. United States, 165 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 
1999); Arner v. Sharper Image Corp., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1282, 1286 (C.D. Cal. 1995); Printers 
Servs. Co. v. Bondurant, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1626, 1631 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Land O’Lakes 
Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 221 F. Supp. 576, 581 (E.D. Wis. 1963). 
168 Winnebago Indus., Inc. v. Oliver & Winston, Inc., 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 335, 341 (T.T.A.B. 
1980). 
169 Pike v. Ruby Foo’s Den, Inc., 232 F.2d 683, 685 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. 
Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678, 679–80 (D. Mass. 1953); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Cameo Exclusive Prods., Inc., 
170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 596, 599 (T.T.A.B. 1971); Wolfies Rest., Inc. v. Lincoln Rest. Corp., 143 
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 310, 311 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964). 
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requirement,170 and yet, infrequently is a naked license found as a matter of 
fact.171 
This legal situation has come under heavy fire.  The few cases finding 
naked licensing are said to be inconsistent with the general line of court 
rulings, thus creating an unhealthy state of legal uncertainty.172  The 
majority of scholars advocate abandoning the quality control requirement 
altogether.173  They argue that the requirement has already become 
somewhat illusory; its abandonment will simply bring the language of law 
in line with judicial practice, and will provide greater clarity to trademark 
owners.174  Few scholars hold the opposite view, that the quality control 
requirement should be enforced more vigorously.175  
Indeed, the quality control requirement in the Lanham Act does not 
seem to function properly.  The flaw lies, in part, in the inadequate 
mechanism by which the requirement is enforced.  No entity has the 
authority to inspect the quality control measures exercised by a trademark 
owner.176  The issue can only be examined within the context of a 
trademark dispute.  One court has even stated explicitly that it had no 
jurisdiction over the naked license claim without such a dispute.177 
Most frequently a naked license argument is raised in infringement 
suits.  The alleged infringer argues that she should be exempted from 
liability, since the trademark owner licensed his mark without proper 
quality control, thereby losing his rights to the mark.178  Naturally, courts 
                                                                                                                          
170 See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959); Land 
O’Lakes Creameries, Inc., 221 F. Supp. at 581; Huntington Nat’l Mattress Co. v. Celanese Corp. of 
Am., 201 F. Supp. 938, 945 (D. Md. 1962). 
171 DRATLER, supra note 142, § 11.03 (“Courts have actually decreed forfeitures . . . on grounds 
of naked licensing in only a handful of cases.”).  
172 Calboli, supra note 157, at 345, 394; Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 17–18; Noel 
Gillespie, Licensing and the “Related Companies” Doctrine, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 209, 210 
(2001); Kevin Parks, “Naked” Is Not a Four-Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the “Quality Control 
Requirement” in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 557 (1992). 
173 DRATLER, supra note 142, § 11.03; Calboli, supra note 157, at 396–400; Gillespie, supra note 
172, at 210–12; W.J. Keating, Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time Has Come, 
89 DICK. L. REV. 363, 365 (1985); Parks, supra note 172, at 557; Kuss, supra note 163, at 381–82. 
174 Calboli, supra note 157, at 397–98; Keating, supra note 173, at 378; Parks, supra note 172, at 
558; Kuss, supra note 163, at 371. 
175 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:61 (“The courts should vigorously insist that a licensor 
actually control the quality of goods and services sold by licensees under the licensed mark.  If this is 
not done, then the requirement of control becomes a mere sham . . . .”); Bannon, supra note 165, at 
579–80 (“If consumers are entitled to rely upon a trademark as a symbol of equal quality, the licensor 
must be required to keep constant watch on its licensees.” (citations omitted)); Johnston, supra note 
156, at 29, 35–36 (“Abolishing the requirement [of quality control] is tantamount to granting the 
licensor trademark rights in gross . . . .  Trademarks would lose their utility as information  
devices . . . .”). 
176 Calboli, supra note 157, at 393–94. 
177 Ditri v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc., 954 F.2d 869, 873–74 (3d Cir. 1992). 
178 See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Oxxford Clothes, Inc., 109 F.3d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir. 1997); Ky. 
Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977); Dawn Donut 
Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959). 
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are unwilling to allow such “culpable infringers” to escape liability and 
thus show great reluctance in accepting naked license claims.179 
Occasionally, a naked license claim is raised in a genuine dispute over 
priority rights in a trademark.  In such cases, courts do consider the claim 
seriously and carefully examine the quality control efforts of the party in 
question.  In fact, findings of a naked license are very common in such 
cases.180  And almost all the cases in which a naked license was found did 
not involve “culpable infringers.”181  
Viewed in this light, judicial practice may still seem inconsistent, but 
can hardly be accused of being unpredictable.  Put simply, the fate of a 
naked license claim depends on the identity of the party raising this claim.  
Thus, the primary reason why the quality control requirement suffers from 
lack of enforcement lies in the judicial hostility towards the parties who 
typically raise the naked license argument.  
It is the licensee, of course, who would naturally be most likely to 
prove that a trademark license is naked—she knows better than anyone 
how much control the licensor actually exercises.  Yet, judicial practice has 
developed the doctrine of “licensee estoppel,” according to which a 
trademark licensee is estopped from challenging the validity of the licensed 
trademark on grounds of insufficient quality control.182  Even when the 
evidence clearly indicates a lack of quality control, the court will reject a 
naked license claim raised by a licensee.183  Underlying the “licensee 
estoppels” are equitable considerations:  
[A] licensee claiming that its own license is a naked license 
essentially seeks to benefit from its own misfeasance. . . . 
[B]y relying on its own ability to offer inferior or nonuniform 
goods and services under the trademark or trade name, the 
licensee seeks to free itself of the constraints imposed by the 
licensor’s ownership of the trademark or trade name.184 
                                                                                                                          
179 DRATLER, supra note 142, § 11.03; Parks, supra note 172, at 541. 
180 See generally Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Imps., Inc., 289 F.3d 589 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(involving concurrent bona fide use); Midwest Plastic Fabricators, Inc. v. Underwriters Labs. Inc., 906 
F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding of a naked license was supported by the finding that the allegedly 
infringed marks became generic); First Interstate Bancorp v. Stenquist, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1704 
(N.D. Cal. 1990) (rejecting the reasoning that the defendant abandoned its trade name because of naked 
licensing); Robinson Co. v. Plastics Research & Dev. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Ark. 1967) 
(accepting defendant’s naked license claim where the court regarded an infringement suit as an attempt 
to capitalize on defendant’s acquired goodwill).  
181 I know of no case involving a “culpable infringer” in which a naked license defense was 
accepted. 
182 See, e.g., Prof’l Golfers Ass’n of Am. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 
1975); E.F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512, 522 (6th Cir. 1943); Westco Grp., 
Inc. v. K.B. & Assocs., Inc., 128 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1086 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
183 Prof’l Golfers, 514 F.2d at 671; E.F. Prichard, 136 F.2d at 522; Westco Grp., 128 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1086. 
184 Westco Grp., 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1089. 
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Licensee estoppel is perhaps the prime factor accounting for poor 
enforcement of the quality control requirement in trademark law.  The 
doctrine essentially treats trademarks as purely private rights rather than as 
public informational devices.  It prefers the dubious concerns with fairness 
in the licensor-licensee relations over the public interest in the accuracy of 
information embedded in trademarks.185  
If a trademark licensee is not controlled, then the licensee, and not the 
formal trademark owner, is the true “source” of the trademarked products.  
Transferring the trademark to the licensee under such circumstances would 
bring the legal rights in accordance with the commercial reality.186  If the 
public interest that the goods sold under a trademark be “genuine” is to be 
taken seriously, this interest should prevail over equitable considerations 
between private parties.  Trademarks should serve as informational 
devices, rather than as pure objects of private property.  The reality behind 
trademarks should be shaped according to consumer expectations and not 
according to contractual rights.  Therefore, a licensee should be able to 
claim that she has acquired rights in a trademark because of an 
uncontrolled license. 
This being said, it should be acknowledged that a legal quality control 
requirement, however strict and efficiently enforced, can hardly guarantee 
that trademark owners will actually invest resources in ensuring the quality 
of their goods.  Many scholars have pointed out the absurdity of requiring 
licensing trademark owners to inspect the quality of the manufactured 
goods, while not imposing any similar requirement on trademark owners 
who manufacture through their own subsidiaries.187  Since trademark 
owners who manufacture through their own subsidiaries are not legally 
obligated to control the quality of goods, the quality control requirement 
cannot guarantee that all trademarked goods will be of the same quality.188  
Thus, a trademark licensor could simply purchase the manufacturing 
licensee company in order to avoid the need to exercise quality control. 
In the oft-cited Kentucky Fried Chicken decision, upholding a very 
questionable quality control program, the Fifth Circuit stated: “[W]e do not 
                                                                                                                          
185 By contrast, in the context of antitrust law, courts give much more weight to public interest 
and readily recognize anticompetitive contractual provisions as void.  See, e.g., Am. Standard, Inc. v. 
Meehan, 517 F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (“Federal courts will not enforce a contract that 
violates the Sherman Act . . . .”). 
186 Of course, if there were many licensees operating in the same geographical area, this solution 
would be impossible.  The proper solution in this case would be to render the mark generic. 
187 See Calboli, supra note 157, at 390–91 (discussing the differential treatment accorded to 
licensor trademark owners and non-licensor trademark owners); Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 
15–16 (“[I]t may be meaningless to require a licensee to produce goods that are of the ‘same quality’ as 
the licensor’s own goods, since the licensor’s own goods may not be of a consistent quality.”); Keating, 
supra note 173, at 365 (stating that the “trademark owner is under no duty to impose standards of 
quality control on products of his own manufacture”); Parks, supra note 172, at 562–63. 
188 Calboli, supra note 157, at 390–91; Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 15–16; Keating, 
supra note 173, at 365; Parks, supra note 172, at 562–63. 
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sit to assess the quality of products sold on the open market. . . . [T]he 
consuming public must be the judge of whether the quality control efforts 
have been ineffectual.”189  Several legal scholars join this line of reasoning, 
asserting that market forces—and not legal doctrines—should direct the 
practices of trademark licensing.190  Indeed, trademark law was initially 
intended to encourage investments in product quality, and not to enforce 
quality control standards.  If trademark owners supervise the quality of the 
goods bearing their marks solely because of their legal obligations, 
trademark law does not function as it should.  And the trouble does not lie 
simply in the loose judicial interpretation of the quality control 
requirement.  More troubling is that trademark owners, even when their 
marks are as famous as KFC’s, may in fact be interested in licensing their 
marks without proper quality control.  This means that trademark owners 
do not have sufficient incentives to invest in the quality of their goods.  
Trademark law cannot alter this commercial reality by requiring 
trademark owners to make investments in which they are uninterested.  
Effective enforcement of the quality control requirement may produce 
some change, but it will hardly alter the basic fact that it may be more 
profitable to invest in creating emotional influence than to offer high 
quality products.  If we are concerned with the current tendency toward 
brand fetishism, the solution should be sought elsewhere.  The legal system 
should strive to encourage investment in the quality of goods, while 
simultaneously discouraging, as much as possible, the investment in brand 
personalities.  These possibilities will be discussed presently. 
2.  Contractual Liability  
It is well-known that although a trademark should identify a consistent 
level of quality, and “the consumer is entitled to assume an equal level of 
quality of goods and services sold through many franchised outlets using a 
single mark,”191 this assumption does not create a legally enforceable 
bargain.192  For example, in Szajna v. General Motors Corp., the plaintiff 
brought an action on behalf of himself and others who purchased 1976 
Pontiac Ventura automobiles which, unbeknownst to them, had been 
equipped with inferior transmissions designed for an entirely different 
vehicle.193  Recognizing the quality assurance function of trademarks, the 
                                                                                                                          
189 Ky. Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 387 (5th Cir. 1977). 
190 E.g., Gillespie, supra note 172, at 209; Landes & Posner, supra note 124, at 270 (“It should be 
apparent that the benefits of trademarks in lowering consumer search costs presuppose legal protection 
of trademarks.”); Kuss, supra note 163, at 378 (discussing how consumers “are in a better position to 
police franchisees than the franchisor”). 
191 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 3:11. 
192 Id. § 3:10; Elizabeth Cutter Bannon, Revisiting “The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection:” Control of Quality and Dilution—Estranged Bedfellows?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 65, 77 
(1990). 
193 503 N.E.2d 760, 761 (Ill. 1986). 
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court nevertheless dismissed the claim, stating that “the name ‘1976 
Pontiac Ventura,’ alone does not create an express warranty of the kind or 
nature of the car’s components.”194 
This position views trademarks as self-enforcing tools of 
competition—the basic assumption is that the trademark owner’s interest 
in creating and preserving the value of his mark will guarantee consistent 
product quality.195  In a world where market forces drive competition in 
alternative directions, however, this assumption may no longer hold water.  
The most direct way to restore the quality assurance function of trademarks 
under these new circumstances is to recognize the trademark’s message of 
an equal product quality as a legally enforceable contractual claim.  
As the court noted in Szajna v. General Motors, consumers are not 
unfamiliar with the phenomenon of varying quality of trademarked 
products.196  Yet, this fact should not lead us to conclude that the 
consumer’s assumption of equal product quality should not be a reasonable 
contractual expectation today.  Consumer behavior may be driven by 
various motives, “some rational, some emotional, some conscious, and 
some unconscious.”197  In addition, different consumers are motivated by 
different reasons.  The legal system is thus confronted with a normative 
choice: which consumer motives should be recognized as legally 
significant, and which consumer groups should be awarded legal 
protection?  
If a consumer who has a “functional relationship” with a mark 
purchases a trademarked product at a premium price, aware that the quality 
of the product might differ from the quality of other trademarked products, 
she may be behaving irrationally.  She may be giving this consideration too 
little credence, or she may be emotionally influenced by the mark, or both.  
At the same time she may, consciously or not, anticipate that the quality 
will be the same, or at least similar.  If we take this latter expectation as 
decisive, then we essentially choose to restore the quality function of the 
trademark.  But if we suppose that uneven product quality is to be expected 
today, we veer close to asserting that it is no longer rational for consumers 
having a “functional relationship” with a trademark to continue purchasing 
trademarked products.  In this case, the economic justification for 
trademark protection loses much of its appeal. 
3.  Tort Liability 
Our toolbox for increasing quality concerns among trademark owners 
                                                                                                                          
194 Id. at 771. 
195 Id.; Bannon, supra note 192, at 77. 
196 Szanja, 503 N.E.2d at 771. 
197 Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Towards a Reconciliation with the Lanham Act, 6 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 158 (1995). 
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includes, so far, the quality control requirement and contractual liability.198  
To these two, we should add a third: tort liability.  Throughout the history 
of trademark law, numerous decisions have pondered the question of 
whether a trademark owner should be liable in case of an injury caused by 
a defective product bearing his mark.199 
According to Section 400 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, several 
decisions established tort liability of trademark owners based solely on the 
fact that their mark appeared on the defective products.200  Some of these 
decisions explicitly based the liability on the consumer’s right to rely upon 
the quality assurance function of the mark.201  For example, in Brandimarti 
v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., the court stated that the consumer who 
purchases a Caterpillar tractor relies on the skill and the reputation 
associated with the Caterpillar trademark; in the eyes of the purchaser, the 
trademark assures product quality.202  Therefore, in the case of a defective 
product, Caterpillar Tractor Co. should be liable.203  Several other 
decisions held that the profits reaped from trademark licensing constitute a 
policy rationale for imposing tort liability on the trademark owner.204 
Yet, this line of cases reflected a minority view.  Mainstream judicial 
decisions under the Restatement (Second) of Torts developed, instead, two 
doctrines to determine trademark licensor’s tort liability: the “apparent 
manufacturer” doctrine205 and the “stream of commerce” doctrine.206  
Although somewhat differing in their justifications, both doctrines lead to 
the same practical outcome: they both base licensor’s tort liability on his 
involvement in the manufacturing process.  Consequently, a large body of 
case law consistently holds that only trademark licensors who are actively 
involved in the manufacturing process and exercise significant quality 
control should bear tort liability for defective products.207  In contrast, 
                                                                                                                          
198 See supra Part IV.A.1–2. 
199 See infra notes 200–14. 
200 Kriscuinas v. Union Underwear Co., No. CIV. A. 93-4216, 1994 WL 523046, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 27, 1994); Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (E.D. Pa. 1973); 
Connelly v. Uniroyal, Inc., 389 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Ill. 1979); Forry v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 A.2d 593, 599 
(Pa. 1968); Brandimarti v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 527 A.2d 134, 139–40 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). 
201 Carter, 360 F. Supp. at 1107; Forry, 237 A.2d at 599; Brandimarti, 527 A.2d at 139–40. 
202 Brandimarti, 527 A.2d at 139–40. 
203 Id. 
204 Kriscuinas, 1994 WL 523046, at *4; Connelly, 389 N.E.2d at 163.  
205 See, e.g., In re TMJ Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 880 F. Supp. 1311, 1321 (D. Minn. 1995); 
Carter, 360 F. Supp. at 1106–07; Hebel v. Sherman Equip., 442 N.E.2d 199, 201 (Ill. 1982); Connelly, 
389 N.E.2d at 162–63. 
206 See, e.g., Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 101 Cal. Rptr. 314, 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); City of 
Hartford v. Associated Constr. Co., 384 A.2d 390, 397 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1978); Bailey v. Innovative 
Mgmt. & Inv., Inc., 916 S.W.2d 805, 807–08 (Miss. Ct. App. 1995). 
207 See, e.g., Kosters v. Seven-Up Co., 595 F.2d 347, 352–53 (6th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. Gen. 
Motors, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 949, 954 (E.D. Ky. 1982); Torres v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 786 P.2d 
939, 946–47 (Ariz. 1990); Kasel, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 325; Associated Constr., 384 A.2d at 397; Firestone 
Steel Prods. Co. v. Barajas, 927 S.W.2d 608, 616 (Tex. 1996). 
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trademark licensors, who do not participate significantly in the 
manufacturing process, are typically exempt from tort liability.208  The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts subsequently adopted this judicial 
approach.209  
A number of cases specifically scrutinized the correlation between tort 
liability and the quality control requirement of the Lanham Act.  It has 
been repeatedly held that the quality control requirement does not indicate 
that all trademark licensors must be sufficiently involved in the 
manufacturing process to be found liable for defective products.210  As one 
court explained, a failure to exercise quality control may result in a loss of 
trademark rights, but not in tort liability.211  Even if the trademark owner 
could have prevented the damage, had he exercised quality control, the 
failure to control does not lead to liability for negligence, since it is not the 
primary cause of the damage.212  Moreover, the level of control needed to 
satisfy the Lanham Act requirement does not result in tort liability.213  
Hence, a trademark owner can exercise sufficient control in order to 
preserve his trademark rights without risking such liability.214  
The legal approach that links tort liability to the degree of involvement 
in the manufacturing process obviously discourages trademark licensors 
from engaging in extensive quality control programs.  Indeed, in order to 
avoid tort liability, trademark owners are advised to retain only the 
absolute minimum control necessary to maintain their rights.215  For 
                                                                                                                          
208 See, e.g., Nelson v. Int’l Paint Co., 734 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1984); Kealoha v. E.I. Du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 844 F. Supp. 590, 597 (D. Haw. 1994); Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, 
Inc., 579 A.2d 26, 35 (Conn. 1990); Hebel, 442 N.E. at 205; Poulos v. Cock ’N Bull Beverage, Inc., 
487 P.2d 1350, 1352 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971); Stanford v. Dairy Queen Prods. of Tex., 623 S.W.2d 797, 
806 (Tex. App. 1981). 
209 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 14 cmt. d (1998) (“The rule stated 
in this Section does not, by its terms, apply to the owner of a trademark who licenses a manufacturer to 
place the licensor’s trademark or logo on the manufacturer’s product and distribute it as though 
manufactured by the licensor.  In such a case, even if purchasers of the product might assume that the 
trademark owner was the manufacturer, the licensor does not ‘sell or distribute as its own a product 
manufactured by another.’  Thus, the manufacturer may be liable under §§ 1–4, but the licensor, who 
does not sell or otherwise distribute products, is not liable under this Section of this Restatement.  
Trademark licensors are liable for harm caused by defective products distributed under the licensor’s 
trademark or logo when they participate substantially in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the 
licensee’s products.  In these circumstances they are treated as sellers of the products bearing their 
trademarks.”). 
210 See, e.g., Allen v. Greenville Hotel Partners, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 672, 676 (D.S.C. 2006); 
Gray v. Derderian, 389 F. Supp. 2d 308, 316 (D.R.I. 2005); BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. v. Jones, 558 
S.E.2d 398, 403 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Anderson v. Turton Dev., Inc., 483 S.E.2d 597, 601 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1997); McGuire v. Radisson Hotels Int’l, Inc., 435 S.E.2d 51, 53–54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993). 
211 Burkert v. Petrol Plus of Naugatuck, Inc., 579 A.2d 26, 32 (Conn. 1990). 
212 Id. 
213 See supra note 208.  
214 Emery v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 25, 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); MCCARTHY, 
supra note 31, § 18:75.  
215 Melissa Evans Buss, Products Liability and Intellectual Property Licensors, 27 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 299, 327 (2000); David Laufer & David Gurnick, Minimizing Vicarious Liability of 
Franchisors for Acts of Their Franchisees, FRANCHISE L.J., Spring 1987, at 24–26. 
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instance, some suggest that licensing agreements state that the licensor has 
no right to interfere with the actual production.216  This situation clearly 
indicates that trademark law has gone down the wrong path. 
Concerned with this situation, legal scholars offer various—and 
contradictory—solutions.  On one end of the spectrum, David J. Franklyn 
argues for reducing the tort liability of trademark licensors.217  Decisions 
imposing liability on trademark licensors who exercise quality control 
punish licensors who are involved in the manufacturing process instead of 
encouraging them.218  Franklyn suggests creating a presumption of non-
liability to counter this problem.219  In contrast, Jennifer Rudis Deschamp 
argues that strengthening tort liability would induce trademark owners to 
engage in quality control programs.220  Deschamp proposes creating a 
presumption of liability.221 
Both Franklyn and Deschamp, however, agree on at least one policy,222 
adopted by both judicial practice and the Restatement (Third) of Torts.  By 
the way of exception, tort liability is imposed on trademark licensors 
regardless of their involvement in the manufacturing process, when the 
identity of the real manufacturer is not sufficiently disclosed,223 or when 
the trademark licensor induces the consumer to believe that he approved 
the quality of the goods bearing his mark.224  
The identity of the real manufacturer is rarely concealed.  Indeed, 
today one is even legally required to disclose the manufacturer’s 
identity.225  Thus, the main question is when we should assume that the 
trademark licensor induces the consumer to believe that the licensor 
controls the quality of the trademarked goods.  I believe we should always 
make this assumption.   
If we assume that a purchaser of Tommy Hilfiger shirts and jeans 
should understand that the shirts are manufactured by Oxford Industries, 
Inc. and the jeans by Pepe Jeans London, while Tommy Hilfiger is not 
significantly involved in the manufacture of these items, then we 
essentially endorse Tommy Hilfiger’s “business of signing his name.”226  If 
the consumer should investigate the identity of the real manufacturer of 
                                                                                                                          
216 Buss, supra note 215, at 327. 
217 See generally Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155.  
218 Id. at 38–39. 
219 Id. at 43. 
220 Jennifer Rudis Deschamp, Has the Law of Products Liability Spoiled the True Purpose of 
Trademark Licensing? Analyzing the Responsibility of a Trademark Licensor for Defective Products 
Bearing Its Mark, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 247, 275 (2006). 
221 Id. at 273. 
222 Id.; Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 61–62. 
223 Dudley Sports Co. v. Schmitt, 279 N.E.2d 266, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972). 
224 See Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc., 437 F.2d 308, 310 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding that liability regarding 
apparent authority is a question for the jury). 
225 16 C.F.R. § 500.5 (2010). 
226 See supra Part II.C. 
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each trademarked item, then what role does the trademark play?  Does it 
provide any product information?  Does it reduce consumers’ search costs?  
The assumption that the consumer should expect only Oxford Industries 
and Pepe Jeans to bear responsibility for defective Tommy Hilfiger shirts 
and jeans amounts to a legal recognition of trademarks as mere 
psychological stimuli.  It is, for all intents and purposes, a legal stamp of 
approval of brand fetishism. 
There is a certain amount of hypocrisy in benefiting from royalties 
paid by the trademark licensee, and later assuming no liability for defective 
trademarked products.  The royalties paid for the license indicate that both 
the trademark owner and the licensee admit that the trademark induces 
consumers to buy the trademarked goods.  When the trademark owner later 
argues that the consumers had no reason to assume that he was 
significantly involved in the manufacturing process, he essentially admits 
having “tricked” the consumer by the licensing agreement.  In fact, he 
acknowledges that the real purpose of putting the trademark on the 
licensee’s products is to induce irrational consumer responses, and not to 
convey meaningful product information. 
I suggest that the consumer should always be entitled to presume that 
the trademark owner either manufactures or substantially controls the 
quality of the goods bearing his mark.  Trademark law should act to restore 
the informative function of trademarks.  A trademark should convey more 
than a brand personality.  It should carry the message that the trademark 
owner is a meaningful source of the goods.  Without such a message, there 
is no justification for granting legal protection to the trademark. 
If market forces no longer provide sufficient incentives for companies 
to treat consumers as rational beings, the law should intervene and restore 
these incentives.  Thus the trademark licensor should always be liable for 
damages caused by defective products bearing his mark.  Lack of quality 
control should not benefit the trademark licensor by exempting him from 
tort liability.  On the contrary, it may be sensible to recognize that lack of 
such control constitutes negligence.  Such a legal approach would 
encourage trademark owners to carefully inspect the goods bearing their 
marks.  
4.  Post-Sale Confusion  
We have thus far surveyed various methods to encourage trademark 
owners to invest resources in the quality of their goods.  An additional 
method of directing trademark owners towards investing in product 
quality, rather than in brand personality, is by discouraging the latter 
investment.  As far as the primary market of the trademark is concerned, 
the phenomenon most closely associated with brand fetishism is the 
growing conspicuousness of trademarks.  As discussed above, some 
trademarks have evolved from product identifiers into identifiers of the 
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consumer herself.227  
The most relevant trademark doctrine here is the doctrine of post-sale 
confusion.  Post-sale confusion occurs when the consumer knowingly 
acquires an imitation of a trademarked product.  The consumer is not 
confused.  When she displays the imitation, however, other people are 
confused to the extent that they are likely to believe that she possesses the 
genuine product.  Such confusion is not the traditional subject matter of 
trademark protection: trademarks are primarily designed to prevent the 
confusion of the buying consumer.228  Yet, in the 1950s, courts started 
regarding post-sale confusion as sufficient to raise liability for trademark 
infringement.229  In 1962, the post-sale confusion doctrine was codified in 
the Lanham Act.230  As it stands today, the doctrine of post-sale confusion 
prevents the consumer from buying a fake Rolex,231 Reebok,232 Levi’s,233 
or Ferrari,234 even if she intentionally wishes to purchase the counterfeit.235  
One court even enjoined a defendant from selling customized kits designed 
to turn a Volkswagen Beetle into a Rolls Royce.236 
If people deliberately wish to buy knock-offs of trademarked products, 
one must have a good reason to restrict the supply for this demand.  Courts 
explain that the wrong of post-sale confusion consists in the fact that the 
seller of knock-offs makes it possible for his consumers to (falsely) acquire 
the prestige associated with displaying the imitation in public.237  
In the same vein, Landes and Posner argue that people advertise 
themselves by wearing clothes, jewelry, or accessories that tell the world 
that they are individuals of refined taste or high income.  If others can buy 
and wear cheap imitations, “the ‘signal’ given out by the purchasers of the 
originals is blurred.”238  If the sole motive for buying knock-offs of 
trademarked goods is to pass oneself off as having a higher income, then 
one could regard the seller of the cheap copy as a kind of contributory 
                                                                                                                          
227 See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
228 Assaf, supra note 8, at 36. 
229 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 
F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) (recognizing, for the first time, the doctrine of post-sale confusion). 
230 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006) (eliminating the requirement that, to establish trademark 
infringement, there should be confusion of “purchasers”); see also S. REP. NO. 87-2107, at 4 (1962), 
reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847. 
231 United States v. Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 1987); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 492 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 
232 Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
233 Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 1980).  
234 Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabbriche Automobili e Corse v. McBurnie, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1843, 1847 (S.D. Cal. 1989). 
235 For additional examples, see MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 23:7. 
236 Rolls-Royce Motors Ltd. v. A & A Fiberglass, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 689, 690–91, 702–03 (N.D. 
Ga. 1977). 
237 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 
F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955); Ferrari, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851. 
238 Landes & Posner, supra note 124, at 308. 
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infringer, who makes it easier for consumers to deceive the people with 
whom they transact in the market of personal relations.239  
Yet, promoting truthful communication in the market of personal 
relations has never been the purpose of trademark law.  Moreover, it is 
highly doubtful that the legal system should intervene in interpersonal 
relations and protect the accuracy of the signal communicating one’s high 
income.  Landes and Posner observe that in the fourteenth century, in 
medieval Europe, magnificence in clothing was “considered the 
prerogative of nobles,” who were “identifiable by modes of dress 
forbidden to others.”240  “Sumptuary laws were repeatedly announced, 
attempting to fix what kinds of clothes people might wear.”241  This 
observation makes a valuable point: in modern western society, there is no 
room for similar laws.  In everyday personal transactions, one’s income is 
nobody’s business.  In this respect, people should be allowed to deceive 
others to their hearts’ content. 
Throughout history, the poor tried to emulate the style of the rich.242  
Whenever a certain signal of wealth was effectively imitated, it lost its 
wealth-signaling function.243  Between the sixteenth and eighteenth 
centuries, for instance, lace was handmade and prohibitively expensive.  In 
the nineteenth century, however, when lace-making machines were 
introduced, the price of lace dropped dramatically.  After an initial, large 
increase in popularity, the sales of lace dropped as well, for it lost its value 
as a reliable signal of wealth.244  In the context of post-sale confusion, 
courts often express concern that a plethora of imitations may lessen the 
high value of the original, which is derived in part from its rarity.245  
Indeed, as the history of lace suggests, widespread knock-offs of 
trademarked articles will probably impair the wealth-signaling function of 
these articles.  To the extent that these articles are purchased for the 
purpose of displaying one’s status, the demand for them will eventually 
drop.  At that point, trademark owners will no longer be able to charge 
                                                                                                                          
239 Id. 
240 Id. at 308 n.83. 
241 Id. at 308. 
242 See Georg Simmel, Fashion, 10 INT’L Q. 130 (1904), reprinted in 62 AM. J. SOC. 541, 542–43, 
548 (1957) (“Within the social embodiments of these contrasts, one side is generally maintained by the 
psychological tendency towards imitation.”). 
243 Id. at 544.  
244 Amotz Zahavi, The Theory of Signal Selection and Some of Its Implications, in 
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM OF BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION 305–27 (Vittorio Pesce Delfino ed., 1987).  
245 See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Keystone Auto. Indus., Inc., 453 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he purchaser of an original may be harmed if the widespread existence of knockoffs decreases the 
original’s value by making the previously scarce commonplace . . . .”); Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & 
Sci. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The Oscar’s value lies 
in its distinctive design, which stands as a well-recognized symbol of excellence in film.”); Esercizio v. 
Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1244–45 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Ferrari has gained a well-earned reputation for 
making uniquely designed automobiles of quality and rarity.”). 
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prices much higher than what is justified by the quality of their goods.  Put 
differently, if Rolex knock-offs are available on every street-corner, Rolex 
will no longer be able to charge premium prices for a status-signaling 
function.  The company will thus be compelled to fix its prices as dictated 
by the quality of its goods.  
If the practice of selling knock-offs becomes widespread, trademarks 
will lose much of their fetishistic status and the demand for goods 
prominently displaying trademarks will eventually drop.  This in turn will 
discourage corporations from designing their trademarks primarily as 
identifiers of the consumer’s lifestyle.  Consequently, the incentive to 
invest resources in the product-identifying function of trademarks and in 
product quality will be restored.  Therefore, denying protection against 
post-sale confusion would ultimately serve the primary purpose of 
trademark law. 
B.  Collateral Markets 
A trademark’s collateral market consists of goods which are not 
closely related to the trademark owner’s primary field of activity. 
1.  The Scope of Protection Against Unauthorized Uses 
Historically, a trademark was protected only within its primary market.  
Trademark law restricted the unauthorized use of another’s mark only on 
“merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those set 
forth in the registration.”246  The idea that a trademark owner should have 
exclusive rights in additional markets was first articulated in the 1920s, the 
very moment in time when brand fetishism emerged.247  
In the famous Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson decision of 1928, Judge 
Learned Hand found that the use of the Yale trademark, registered for 
locks and keys, when used on flashlights and batteries constituted an 
infringement:  
[A] merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the 
use of his mark outside the field of his own exploitation to 
justify interposition by a court.  His mark is his authentic 
seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries 
his name for good or ill.  If another uses it, he borrows the 
owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his 
own control.248 
Along the same lines, Frank Schechter published his famous article, 
                                                                                                                          
246 Trade-Mark Act of 1905, 15 U.S.C. § 96 (1905), repealed by Lanham Trademark Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (1946).   
247 See supra Part II.B and accompanying text. 
248 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928). 
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The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, one year earlier, arguing that 
trademark law should protect the selling power of trademarks.249  
Schechter suggested that trademarks should be protected against 
“dilution”—an unauthorized use of a famous mark on non-competing 
goods, which gradually whittles away the power and the uniqueness of the 
mark.250 
The trademark infringement test and the dilution doctrine were 
interrelated during the 1920s to 1960s.251  These doctrines complemented 
one another, protecting trademark owners in collateral markets.252  When 
the infringement test was interpreted narrowly, the judicial enthusiasm 
toward dilution grew; conversely, as the infringement test was broadened, 
courts begun showing hostility toward dilution claims.253  Today, however, 
both infringement and dilution provide remarkably broad trademark 
protection in collateral markets.254  
Since the passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, the test for trademark 
infringement no longer revolves around the descriptive properties of the 
goods.  Rather, the sole question for a court is whether a reasonably 
prudent purchaser would be likely to assume a connection between the 
trademark owner and the alleged infringer.255  Over time, new kinds of 
mistaken connections were added to the infringement test.256  Today, for an 
infringement to occur, a consumer does not have to assume that the 
defendant’s product was manufactured by the plaintiff or under his 
supervision.  Instead, an infringing use is any use likely to cause confusion 
“as to the affiliation, connection, or association as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval.”257  Under this broad confusion test, “Hallmark,” 
when used for an automobile dealership was found to infringe “Hallmark,” 
as it is used for greeting cards,258 “Lloyd’s of London” aftershave was 
found confusingly similar to “Lloyd’s of London” insurance services,259 
and the “Classic Tiffany” trademark for automobiles was denied 
                                                                                                                          
249 Schechter, supra note 134, at 830–31. 
250 See id. at 825 (“It is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the 
public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods.”). 
251 See Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in Trademark Law, 
85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 1007–08 (2001). 
252 Id. at 1007. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. at 1014–16. 
255 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:24 (“That the goods or services are noncompetitive does not 
answer the question of whether the goods are so ‘related’ that a reasonable buyer is likely to think that 
defendant’s goods or services are somehow connected with, or sponsored by, the plaintiff, due to 
similar marks.”). 
256 Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion About Confusion: Trademark Polices and Fair Use, 
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157, 174–75 (2008) (listing doctrines that address issues about which consumers 
supposedly get confused). 
257 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
258 Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 990, 1000 (W.D. Mo. 1986).  
259 Corp. of Lloyd’s v. Louis D’Or of Fr., Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 313, 317 (T.T.A.B. 1979). 
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registration in the face of the famous jewelry mark.260 
At the same time, the doctrine of dilution provides a powerful 
additional tool for enjoining unauthorized trademark uses in collateral 
markets.  Although it initially encountered academic criticism,261 judicial 
hostility,262 and the antagonism of the federal legislature,263 the doctrine 
has prevailed over opposition.  Codified in federal law in 1996,264 and 
strengthened by the 2006 amendment,265 the doctrine of dilution is today 
firmly ingrained in United States trademark law.  
Dilution occurs when a well-known trademark is used on goods or 
services so different from the initial field of activity of the trademark 
owner that consumers are not likely to be confused.266  The evil of dilution 
lies in the fact that an additional associative link is affixed to the famous 
mark, impairing its uniqueness.267  Given this rationale, the doctrine of 
dilution can easily enjoin uses of a trademark in fields far removed from its 
                                                                                                                          
260 Tiffany & Co. v. Classic Motor Carriages Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835, 1841 (T.T.A.B. 
1989). 
261 See, e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade 
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1191–94 (1948) (noting that proponents of dilution theory suggest that it 
should be “given equal protection with the interest against confusion”); Walter J. Derenberg, The 
Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 455–56 (1956) 
(discussing a First Circuit Court of Appeals case, which contended that dilution doctrine “has no 
application when the question is whether the marks being used on goods of substantially the same 
descriptive properties are similar enough to cause confusion”); Brian A. Jacobs, Trademark Dilution on 
the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 163 (2004) (describing court decisions as “a 
patchwork of conflicting doctrines”); Jonathan E. Moskin, Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of 
Trademark Protection, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 122, 125–26 (1993) (criticizing a proposed remedy for 
overly narrow focus of law as lacking a proposition for how courts could prevent dilution). 
262 Courts required that plaintiffs claiming dilution of their marks demonstrate a likelihood of 
confusion, although the doctrine of dilution protects trademarks in absence of confusion.  See, e.g., 
HMH Publ’g Co. v. Lambert, 482 F.2d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1973) (disregarding theory of likelihood of 
confusion); DCA Food Indus. v. Hawthorn Mellody, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 574, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) 
(“Some amount of consumer confusion must be shown in order to proceed on a dilution claim.”); Girl 
Scouts of the U.S. v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1233–34 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) 
(“[E]ven where there is no confusion as to the origin of the goods, the courts have denied relief where 
confusion is absent.”). 
263 In 1988, Congress considered, but did not add protection against dilution to the Lanham Act.  
The House of Representatives noted: “Serious questions were raised about [the anti-dilution] provisions 
by persons concerned with the dissemination of First Amendment protected communications, and with 
advertising their goods and services to the public.”  H.R. Rep. No. 1028, 100th Cong., pt. 3, at 5 
(1988).  
264 Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Pub. L. No. 104–98, 109 Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (1995)).  
265 Trademark Dilution Revision Act, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052, 1063, 1064, 1092, 1125, 1127 (2006)); see also Bone, supra note 137, at 187, 
198 (discussing the aspects in which the 2006 Amendment broadened the scope of protection against 
dilution). 
266 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(“This Court has defined dilution as either the blurring of a mark’s product identification or the 
tarnishment of the affirmative associations a mark has come to convey.”).  This Article discusses the 
first type of dilution known as “blurring.”  The second type of dilution, “tarnishment,” is not discussed 
here. 
267 See Schechter, supra note 134, at 830–31 (concluding that the “preservation of the uniqueness 
of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its protection”). 
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initial product field.  For instance, the use of the name “Tiffany” for 
restaurant services,268 and for a movie theater,269 was found to dilute the 
famous jewelry mark, the use of “Bacardi” on jewelry was enjoined as a 
dilution of the trademark for rum,270 and the “Lexus” automobile mark was 
protected against its use on personal care products.271 
Several scholars argue that dilution and confusion are “states of mental 
association existing on a continuum.”272  Others reject this view and insist 
that confusion and dilution are two inconsistent states of mind—dilution 
occurs only when the consumer understands that the junior user is not 
connected to the trademark owner.273  Confusion, by contrast, occurs when 
a consumer assumes that the junior user is connected to the trademark 
owner.  These two states of mind cannot exist simultaneously in one 
consumer—either a person believes that the similarly marked goods are 
connected or not.274  
The judicial practice has not definitively chosen between these two 
approaches.  Some courts, finding confusion, go further to establish 
dilution as a matter of course.275  Others state that where confusion is 
found, dilution should not be considered.276  Occasionally, consumer 
confusion is even said to prove dilution.277 
                                                                                                                          
268 Tiffany & Co. v. Bos. Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 838 (D. Mass. 1964). 
269 Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., 264 N.Y.S. 459, 460–61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932). 
270 Bacardi & Co. v. Bacardi Mfg. Jewelers Co., 174 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 286 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
271 Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Natural Health Trends Corp., No. 04-9028, 2005 U.S. 
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interests fairly, courts must recognize that confusion and dilution involve distinct and inconsistent 
states of mind.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
274 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:72. 
275 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2000); Safeway 
Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Disc. Drugs, Inc., 675 F.2d 1160, 1167–68 (11th Cir. 1982); Nike Inc. v. 
Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D. Ga. 2003); Lexington Mgmt. Corp. v. 
Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
276 See, e.g., Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049, 1058 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Having 
found infringement due to a likelihood of confusion, and there being no remedies for dilution separate 
from the available remedies for infringement, we need not address the issue of dilution.”); Morningside 
Grp. Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Grp., L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 1999); Berghoff Rest. Co. v. 
Lewis W. Berghoff, Inc., 499 F.2d 1183, 1185 (7th Cir. 1974); Starbucks U.S. Brands L.L.C. v. Ruben, 
78 U.S.P.Q.2d 1741, 1746 (T.T.A.B. 2006).  
277 Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 636 (9th Cir. 2008) (accepting surveys 
demonstrating consumer confusion as evidence of dilution); Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 
1029, 1037 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Even if the conflicting marks were not identical, Garcia (the junior user) 
would still not prevail because Horphag presented additional evidence of dilution.”); Nabisco, Inc. v. 
PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 219 (2d Cir. 1999) (“Consumer confusion would undoubtedly dilute the 
distinctive selling power of a trademark.”). 
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This hesitation is easily explicable.  In a world of increasingly frequent 
and far-flung brand extensions, consumers’ perceptions change rapidly—
what does not confuse today may confuse tomorrow.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the boundaries between dilution and confusion are not clear-
cut.  
The trend toward brand extensions broadens trademark protection in at 
least two ways.  First, courts frequently find that if a plaintiff is a 
diversified company, using its trademark on various goods, the consumer, 
seeing the mark on yet another product, is more likely to assume a 
connection to the plaintiff.278  For instance, one court held that “[g]iven the 
wide diversity of businesses that operate under the VIRGIN mark, . . .  
consumers might mistakenly believe that defendant’s gasoline station was 
connected in some fashion to [the Virgin Group].”279  In another case, the 
mark Harley-Hog, as used for pork, was denied registration, because 
Harley-Davidson had used its marks for a wide variety of whimsical 
collateral products, including beer, wine coolers, chocolate bars, and 
more.280  A consumer having knowledge of these uses would not be 
surprised to see Harley-Hog pork products. 
Second, judicial practice consistently maintains that if other companies 
in the market use their marks in both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s 
fields, confusion is more likely, even if neither the plaintiff nor the 
defendant is a diversified company.281  For example, one court stated that 
                                                                                                                          
278 See, e.g., Tropic-Aire, Inc. v. Approved Prod., Inc., 275 F.2d 728, 731 (C.C.P.A. 1960) 
(concluding that “[a]t first blush it might seem that opposer’s sales under the ‘Tropie-Aire’ trademark 
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‘R US’ mark used by defendant on phones, originate with or is otherwise connected with or sponsored 
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279 Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Virgin Petroleum, Inc., No. 99-12826, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8100, at 
*28 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2000). 
280 Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v. Pierce Foods Corp., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 857, 863 (T.T.A.B. 
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281 See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding 
that use of same mark in fields of software and email service is likely to cause confusion, because there 
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consumers know that it is common for a single trademark to be used for an 
entire line of apparel, including footwear.  Therefore, apparel and shoes 
sold under similar trademarks would confuse the public.282  Another court 
articulated a similar statement concerning apparel and perfume.283  In 
Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Satellite International Ltd., an 
application to register the mark Sako for shoes was successfully opposed 
by the holder of the mark Seiko for watches, based on the argument that 
many companies, including Anne Klein, Fila and Gucci, market shoes and 
watches under a single trademark.284  Empirical evidence supports this 
judicial intuition: one experiment found that people are more likely to be 
confused by a Cadillac notebook computer, when they have been 
previously exposed to a similar brand extension by Mercedes-Benz.285  
Given this reality, the broadening scope of trademark protection seems 
inevitable.  If corporations continue launching increasingly distant brand 
extensions, consumer’s expectations would change accordingly, and a 
corresponding infinite expansion of legal protection must follow.  
Moreover, expanding legal protection influences consumer perception as 
well.  The more trademarks are protected against unauthorized use in 
distant product fields, either based on confusion or on dilution, the more 
the consumer becomes accustomed to the idea that virtually every use of 
famous trademarks must be authorized.286  Consequently, the consumer is 
likely to be confused by an unauthorized use of a famous mark on any 
product.287 
Indeed, the current trademark infringement test has an unlimited 
                                                                                                                          
F.3d 466, 480–81 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that to answer the question whether using the same mark on 
peat moss and on fertilizer is likely to cause confusion, the court must consider whether other 
companies sell both products); Polyglycoat Corp. v. Envtl. Chems., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (finding that use of same trademark on both a car dealership and an auto body shop was likely to 
cause confusion because dealerships often have auto body shops). 
282 Villager, Inc. v. Dial Shoe Co., 256 F. Supp. 694, 701 (E.D. Pa. 1966). 
283 Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imps. Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1174–75 (2d Cir. 1976). 
284 Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Satellite Int’l Ltd., 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1317, 1319 
(T.T.A.B. 1991). 
285 See Lee et al., supra note 8, at 933–34 (describing a hypothetical scenario with luxury 
automobiles and laptop computers). 
286 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:9 (“If consumers are conditioned to see certain trademarks 
appear licensed and authorized on goods and services far removed from their origins, would they not 
also be likely to think that unauthorized uses on far-flung goods and services are also authorized? . . . If 
consumers think that most uses of a trademark require authorization, then in fact they will require 
authorization because the owner can enjoin consumer confusion caused by unpermitted uses . . . .”); see 
also RICHARD L. KIRKPATRICK, LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW 173 (1999) (“The 
use of a well-known mark on collateral products tends to condition the public to expect a wide variety 
of seemingly unrelated products to come from the source symbolized by that mark, making it possible 
to protect the mark far afield from its core product.”); Austin, supra note 256, at 175 (“We have a 
typical chicken-and-egg problem here: do brands expand as a result of the efforts of marketers, or do 
changes in the law encourage marketers to think of new ways of expanding brands?”). 
287 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:9. 
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potential for expansion.288  The only factor determining whether a 
trademark is infringed is consumer perception—and consumer perception 
in this field is very flexible.  The concept of confusion is rather indefinite.  
Courts recognize that under the current infringement test, which includes 
confusion about affiliation, sponsorship, or approval, the perceived 
connection may be vague.289  Holding that Dogiva dog biscuits infringe on 
the famous Godiva chocolate mark, one court noted:  
As long as the public believes there is some connection 
between GODIVA chocolates and DOGIVA dog biscuits, it 
is immaterial whether the public thinks that the producer of 
GODIVA chocolates actually is making and selling 
DOGIVA dog biscuits, whether DOGIVA dog biscuits are 
being produced under its supervision, or whether some other 
arrangement exists.  Consumers are not concerned with such 
details.290 
This vague concept of confusion best explains why courts and 
commentators conflate confusion and dilution.  Indeed, what kind of 
confusion occurs when a consumer comes upon Hallmark automobiles,291 
or Lloyd’s of London aftershave?292  How is it different from the dilution 
caused by Lexus personal care products,293 or Bacardi jewelry?294  
Considering that courts usually base their findings on judicial intuition 
rather than on survey evidence,295 it is no wonder that the all-encompassing 
confusion test merges with the concept of dilution.  Indeed, some scholars 
argue that dilution has become redundant, since the broad confusion test 
embraces virtually every unauthorized use of a famous trademark.296 
A relatively new doctrine of subliminal confusion erases the already 
blurred borderline between dilution and confusion entirely.  According to 
this doctrine, confusion may be found even when the consumer identifies 
                                                                                                                          
288 Assaf, supra note 8, at 41–42 (asserting that the current likelihood of confusion test has the 
potential to indefinitely expand the scope of trademark protection). 
289 Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1690, 1697 n.7 (1st Cir. 1989) (“[T]he 
public’s lack of knowledge as to the exact identity of th[e] source is irrelevant . . . .”); KIRKPATRICK, 
supra note 286, at 131–32. 
290 Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 231 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 562, 567 (C.D. Cal. 1986). 
291 Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Hallmark Dodge, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Mo. 1986).  
292 Corp. of Lloyd’s v. Louis D’Or of Fr., Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 313, 314 (T.T.A.B. 1979). 
293 Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Natural Health Trends Corp., 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475, 
1475 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
294 Bacardi & Co. v. Bacardi Mfg. Jewelers Co., 174 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 286 (N.D. Ill. 1972). 
295 Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 867–
71 (2004) (“[S]urvey evidence influences courts’ deliberations on what potential consumers might 
think around 35.2 percent of the time . . . .”). 
296 Magliocca, supra note 251, at 967–68 (“[S]trong (i.e., famous) marks are already protected 
from virtually all concurrent uses by infringement doctrine, and therefore dilution extends no additional 
protection . . . .”); Staffin, supra note 197, at 162–64 (“Perhaps the most potent criticism of the dilution 
doctrine is that it is not necessary.”). 
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the manufacturer of the defendant’s product, but because of a subliminal or 
subconscious association with the plaintiff, prescribes the properties and 
reputation of the plaintiff’s products to those of the defendant.297  
This subliminal confusion doctrine highlights the amorphous shape of 
the current confusion test.  Assumptions as to the connection between the 
trademark owner and the alleged infringer do not even have to reach the 
consumer’s consciousness.  All this begs the question: to what extent does 
the consumer need protection from this kind of confusion?  To answer this 
question, the next section will discuss what consumers actually expect and 
what they are legally entitled to expect concerning trademark use in 
collateral markets. 
2.  Quality Control and Tort Liability  
As discussed above, the Lanham Act requires that a trademark license 
includes a mechanism of quality control.  This requirement has been 
subject to rather lax judicial interpretation and many scholars suggest 
abandoning it altogether.298  These scholars argue that the justification for 
abandoning the quality control requirement is even more persuasive in the 
field of collateral licensing than in the realm of classical licensing.299  The 
primary rationale underlying the quality control requirement is to ensure 
that all goods sold under a trademark are of the same quality.  Arguably, 
this rationale is irrelevant when a trademark is licensed in an entirely 
dissimilar field.300  For instance, if the Coca-Cola mark is licensed for 
teddy bears, it is meaningless to require the Coca-Cola Company to control 
the quality of the teddy bears so as to ensure that it is consistent with the 
quality of the soft drinks.301  
In collateral licensing, the trademark owner is usually not in a position 
to control the quality of the licensed products.  He has never manufactured 
                                                                                                                          
297 See Stern’s Miracle-Gro Prods., Inc. v. Shark Prods., Inc., 823 F. Supp. 1077, 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993) (noting that “trademark laws are designed to protect this type of subtle, associational 
confusion”); Farberware, Inc. v. Mr. Coffee, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 291, 302 (D. Del. 1990) (evaluating the 
possibility of subliminal confusion among customers between Farberware and Mr. Coffee’s Quick 
Brew). 
298 See supra notes 163–75 and accompanying text.  
299 Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 16, 46 (“The quality control requirement is even more 
puzzling in the collateral . . . licensing contexts.”); Daniel Klerman, Trademark Dilution, Search Costs, 
and Naked Licensing, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1759, 1767–68 (2006) (describing the quality control 
requirement in collateral licensing as an unnecessary transaction cost impairing market efficiency); 
Parks, supra note 172, at 538–39, 544–45 (asserting that in collateral licensing, there is no standard of 
quality against which to compare the goods of the licensee). 
300 Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 45–46 (“One cannot reasonably expect a collateral or 
promotional licensor to police its licensees’ goods to determine whether they are of the same quality as 
other goods bearing the same mark . . . .”); Parks, supra note 172, at 538–39 (“[T]here is no legitimate 
reason for imposing additional quality control obligations on licensors . . . .”). 
301 See Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 16 (providing Coca-Cola hypothetical); see also 
Parks, supra note 172, at 538–39 (“[E]valuating the relative quality of the licensor’s primary goods and 
licensed products is necessarily a meaningless comparison of ‘apples and oranges.’”). 
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the products in question and hence has neither the knowledge nor the 
expertise to specify appropriate quality standards for the licensee.302  In 
addition, the economic incentive to engage in quality control is much 
weaker for collateral licensors than for classical licensors because 
consumer quality expectations in collateral markets are not high.  Thus, 
while a consumer has rather precise expectations from a Coke beverage, a 
defective Coke teddy bear is unlikely to damage Coca-Cola’s reputation.303  
Finally, as a matter of fact, collateral trademark licensors do not engage in 
quality control programs, but merely preserve formal contractual rights to 
control in order to satisfy the Lanham Act requirement.304  
All this has led several scholars to conclude that, in the context of 
collateral licensing, “[t]o require the owner of the trademark to inaugurate 
an imaginary quality-control program to satisfy legal requirements, 
constructed by courts in dissimilar situations, is to elevate form over 
substance.  The trademark owner is subject to unnecessary expense without 
any real benefit to consumers.”305 
Relying on similar arguments, David J. Franklyn argues for exempting 
collateral licensors from tort liability for defective products.306  While 
classical licensors are often engaged in the manufacturing process and 
therefore should bear tort liability, collateral licensors are, practically 
speaking, incapable of exercising quality control.  Imposing liability on 
them would therefore be inequitable.307  In collateral markets, the 
trademark “licensor functions primarily as a promoter [of the product] and 
does not appear to be a manufacturer.”308  Franklyn argues that when the 
industry in which the trademark owner is licensing is far removed from his 
primary field of activity, “consumers will be hard-pressed to argue that 
                                                                                                                          
302 See Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 16–17 (noting the lack of “relevant quality 
benchmark[s]” in such scenarios); Keating, supra note 173, at 378 (describing quality control 
requirements in such scenarios as “imaginary”); Alfred M. Marks, Trademark Licensing—Towards a 
More Flexible Standard, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 641, 648 (1988) (“The trademark licensing rules with 
respect to quality control have not caught up with business practice.”); Parks, supra note 172, at 544–
45 (describing the quality control requirement as rarely enforced in practice). 
303 Neil A. Goldberg & Joseph L. Mooney, Product Licensing: An Emerging Litigation Arena, 
FOR DEF., Dec. 2006, at 70, 74–75. 
304 Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 14, 19 (“[B]eyond reserving such contractual rights, it 
appears that many collateral and promotion licensors do little to fulfill the quality control 
requirement.”); Johnston, supra note 156, at 35 (noting that licensor may be “susceptible to a charge of 
naked licensing”). 
305 Keating, supra note 173, at 378; see also Calboli, supra note 157, at 382–83 (summarizing 
proponents of elimination of quality control requirements for promotional goods); Franklyn, Apparent 
Manufacturer, supra note 154, at 690 (discussing Parks’s observations regarding evasion of control 
requirements in collateral licensing); Johnston, supra note 156, at 35–36 (summarizing proponents of 
elimination of quality control requirements for promotional goods); Parks, supra note 172, at 562 
(describing Keating’s argument regarding a property right analysis). 
306 Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 57–58. 
307 Id. at 47 (“Such licensors are not compelling targets for strict liability because they rarely are 
in a position to ensure that the licensed goods are free of defects.”). 
308 Id. 
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they believed the licensor made or dictated the standards for making the 
licensed goods.”309  He suggests that the trademark owner is not a 
“compelling target[]” for tort liability in such situations, since he is not “in 
a position to ensure that the licensed goods are free of defects.”310  As the 
degree of “collateralness” increases, the justification for imposing tort 
liability on a trademark licensor decreases, Franklyn concludes.311 
One of the few decisions that examines tort liability of a trademark 
licensor in the context of a collateral market is an Indiana case, Kennedy v. 
Guess, Inc.312  This case involved an umbrella that broke and struck the 
plaintiff in the face, causing injuries.  The umbrella bore the Guess 
trademark and so the plaintiff sued Guess, Inc. as one of the parties 
responsible for the defective umbrella.  Guess, Inc., however, neither 
ordered nor received the umbrellas at issue.  It was never in possession of 
any of the umbrellas nor did it manufacture, supply, distribute, assemble, 
design, or sell them.  Guess, Inc. simply licensed its name for placement on 
various products, including umbrellas.313  
The Indiana Court of Appeals held that by labeling the product as a 
designer label product, Guess, Inc. vouched for the product and induced 
the consumer to believe that the product she purchased was of a superior 
quality.314  The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed, holding that trademark 
licensors should bear responsibility for defective products bearing their 
marks only inasmuch as their relative role in manufacturing, design, and 
distribution warrants.315  This result is consistent with the dominant view in 
the legal literature: collateral trademark licensors should be exempted from 
tort liability, since they are not involved in the manufacturing process. 
All this seems quite logical.  If the trademark owner has no means of 
performing quality control, how can the court require him, or even 
encourage him, to exercise such control?  And if the consumer does not 
expect the trademark owner to control the quality of goods in collateral 
markets, how will he benefit if such control is actually exercised? 
Given the lack of quality control and the consumer’s assumed 
understanding of this reality, we must still ask, why are brand extensions 
so enormously profitable?316  Brand extensions allow the licensee to save 
the promotional costs, to diminish the risks of entering a new market,317 
                                                                                                                          
309 Franklyn, Apparent Manufacturer, supra note 154, at 715. 
310 Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 47. 
311 Franklyn, Apparent Manufacturer, supra note 154, at 715. 
312 806 N.E.2d 776 (Ind. 2004). 
313 Id. at 779–83. 
314 Kennedy v. Guess, Inc., 765 N.E.2d 213, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
315 Kennedy, 806 N.E.2d at 786. 
316 See Magid et al., supra note 13, at 31–32 (listing several reasons why brand extensions 
represent immense potential economic benefits for a business). 
317 See Loken & John, supra note 88, at 71 (observing that firms seek to capitalize on established 
brand names to decrease costs associated with launching new products); Magid et al., supra note 13, at 
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and to charge premium prices.318  At the same time, they allow the 
trademark owner to benefit from high fees without any efforts.319  Yet what 
stands behind these fees?  Why is a consumer inclined to buy a brand 
extension, when there seems to be no rational basis for such preference?  
Why would a consumer be inclined to buy a Jaguar perfume or Harley-
Davidson sunglasses, when these companies clearly have no proven 
expertise in the respective product fields? 
The trend toward brand fetishism provides one possible explanation for 
this behavior.  As previously noted, trademark owners today strive to 
create brands evoking strong consumer emotions,320 which can partly 
explain the success of brand extensions.  Indeed, consumers who have an 
emotional relationship with a brand respond more positively to brand 
extensions than consumers who have a functional relationship with the 
brand, that is, consumers who perceive the brand merely as a carrier of 
product information.321  The former group of loyal consumers tends to 
broaden their loyalty to brand extensions.322  
The success of brand extensions can also be linked to the “mere 
exposure” effect.323  It has been well-established that people tend to 
develop a preference for things merely out of familiarity.  The more often a 
person sees an object, the more pleasing and likeable that object.324  In 
other words, even absent any special emotional relationship with a brand, 
consumers may prefer a brand extension over a new brand simply because 
they are familiar with the name.325 
A trademark in collateral markets, then, does not serve to provide 
product information and save consumer search costs.  Rather, its primary 
                                                                                                                          
32 (noting the reduction in promotional costs); Pitta & Katsanis, supra note 88, at 51 (“Leveraging the 
brand equity of a successful brand promises to make introduction of a new entry less costly by trading 
on an established name.”).  
318 Joffre Swait et al., The Equalization Price: A Measure of Consumer-Perceived Brand Equity, 
10 INT’L J. RES. MARKETING 23, 25–26 (1993). 
319 Bannon, supra note 165, at 587 (“Quite simply, the trademark owner sees a ‘cash cow’ when 
he is shown the value of licensing his trademark and the potential of ‘exploitation.’”). 
320 See supra Part II.B. 
321 AAKER & JOACHIMSTHALER, supra note 14, at 155. 
322 BHOTE, supra note 47, at 31; see also Fournier, supra note 62, at 365 (providing an example of 
loyal consumers who buy brand extensions). 
323 Robert B. Zajonc, Attitudinal Effects of Mere Exposure, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
June 1968, at 1, 1–2. 
324 Id. at 1, 3 (describing the elements of the author’s examination of the frequency-value 
relationship). 
325 Marketing literature does not elaborate on the psychological reasons causing consumers to 
purchase brand extensions.  However, two sources mention the “mere exposure effect” as a possible 
reason for the success of brand extensions.  See Dacin & Smith, supra note 112, at 233 (“[I]n forming 
judgments about an extension, consumers are likely to refer more to their beliefs about individual 
products affiliated with the brand.”); Zeynep Gürhan-Canli & Durairaj Maheswaran, The Effects of 
Extensions on Brand Name Dilution and Enhancement, 35 J. MARKETING RES. 464, 472 (1998) (“Our 
findings also appear to be consistent with mere exposure effects, which suggests that repeated exposure 
may lead to increased preference for proattitudinal arguments in low-involvement conditions.”). 
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function is to exploit a consumer’s emotions or uncontrolled mental 
reactions for the benefit of the trademark owner and the licensee.  
Licensing fees are paid for the mere possibility to exploit the psychological 
effects of the mark on the consumer.  
It is true that in the context of collateral licensing, quality control of 
the trademark owner has no real benefit for the consumer.  But this very 
fact indicates that collateral licensing as a whole has little economic benefit 
for the consumer.  It has never been the purpose of trademark law to 
protect the psychological influence of trademarks on the consumer.  The 
competitive advantage gained by using a trademark on dissimilar products 
is not justifiable in economic terms.  In addition, brand extensions cause 
market concentration, allowing big firms to grow ever bigger.326  
Trademarks should not be protected outside their primary markets.  
The borderline between the primary market and collateral markets should 
be determined based on whether the consumer reasonably assumes that the 
trademark owner manufactures the goods in question or exercises a quality 
control over these goods.  If the customer does not assume so, the 
trademark carries no economic benefit for her.  Therefore, the customer 
will suffer no financial damage if another company uses an identical 
trademark and establishes its own trademark rights in a collateral market.  
Put differently, the consumer would not suffer economic damage if the 
company owning the trademark Jaguar for perfume were to have no 
connection to luxury Jaguar cars. 
Trademark law is not compelled to follow commercial reality.  If the 
practice of brand extensions has led the modern consumer to believe that 
virtually any use of famous trademarks requires authorization, it does not 
mean that trademark law has no choice but to protect these trademarks in 
all product fields.  Trademark law should act to shape, rather than merely 
reflect business norms.327  As will be discussed presently, consumer 
perception in the context of collateral markets is flexible and easily 
changeable.  The elimination of trademark protection in these markets will 
                                                                                                                          
326 Louis A. Thomas, Incumbent Firms’ Response to Entry: Price, Advertising, and New Product 
Introduction, 17 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 527, 538–40 (1999). 
327 A similar argument was made in the context of trademark protection in merchandising 
markets.  See Robert C. Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights: An Analysis of the Merchandising of 
Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L. REV. 603, 613 (1984) [hereinafter Denicola, Institutional Publicity 
Rights] (discussing the utilization of qualified injunctions to minimize anticompetitive consequences 
while also reducing confusion); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 487–88 (“The real underlying 
issue is whether the trademark law should act here as a creator or as a reflector of societal norms.”).  In 
the context of the post-sale confusion doctrine, see Austin, supra note 256, at 175 (“[S]hould the law 
fall into step with marketers’ innovations, and bolster their activities with legal rights to match?”).  And 
in the context of territorial aspects of trademark law, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and 
Territory: Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 889–90 (2004) 
(“[S]hould trademark law be structured reactively to protect whatever consumer understandings or 
producer goodwill develops, or should it proactively seek to shape the ways in which consumers shop 
and producers sell or seek to acquire rights, thus shaping how the economy functions?”). 
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eventually eliminate consumer confusion as well.  
3.  The Flexibility of Consumer Perception in the Context of Collateral 
Markets 
Traditionally, trademark law protected trademarks only in their 
primary markets.328  Thus, the legal assumption was that a consumer could 
bear in mind several trademarks, each indicating another company in a 
different product field.  Has the modern consumer, in an era of extreme 
corporate diversification, lost this ability?  Apparently not.  Identical marks 
peacefully coexist in different markets today: witness Eagle shirts, Eagle 
pencils, Eagle Pretzels, and Eagle condensed milk; or Delta airlines, Delta 
dental insurance, and Delta faucets.329 
Courts consistently state that when different companies in collateral 
markets use identical trademarks for a number of years, the public learns to 
distinguish between the companies.  In such cases, the junior user acquires 
trademark rights in the market in which he has used the mark and the 
senior user cannot expand into this market.330  As Judge Learned Hand 
noted, “[t]he owner’s rights in such appendant markets are easily lost; they 
must be asserted early, lest they be made the means of reaping a harvest 
which others have sown.”331  For example, one company owned the 
trademark Heartland for women’s shoes, while a junior user used the same 
mark for shirts.  The court held that the senior user did not have a right to 
expand into the product field of the junior user.332  In another case, a junior 
user was held to have acquired exclusive rights in the trademark “Tiffan E” 
for cosmetics, which prevented the owner of the jewelry mark from 
expanding into this field.333 
The flexibility of consumer perception in the context of collateral 
markets is especially evident in the field of assignment and license-back 
agreements and coexistence agreements.  Assignment and license-back 
agreements are generally employed to settle trademark conflicts, especially 
pending litigations.334  The defendant assigns its trademark to the plaintiff 
and the plaintiff licenses the mark back to the defendant.335  Assignment 
and license-back agreements are said to have the beneficial effect of 
                                                                                                                          
328 See supra Part IV.B.1. 
329 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:11. 
330 See, e.g., Patsy’s Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209, 212–13 (2d Cir. 2003); 
Commerce Nat’l Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 435 (3d Cir. 2000); 
Artcraft Novelties Corp. v. Baxter Lane Co. of Amarillo, 685 F.2d 988, 989–91 (5th Cir. 1982); Mach. 
Head v. Dewey Global Holdings Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1323 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Clark & 
Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 138–39 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).  
331 Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk Co., 132 F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1943). 
332 Clark & Freeman, 811 F. Supp. at 141. 
333 Am. Hygienic Labs. Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1979, 1983 (T.T.A.B. 1989). 
334 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:9; Calboli, supra note 157, at 384 (observing that such 
agreements are most frequently utilized to settle claims of trademark infringement). 
335 See, e.g., Calboli, supra note 157, at 384 (describing the practice of license-back).  
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bringing commercial reality into congruence with customer perception; 
consumer confusion is eliminated by bringing the two sources of goods 
bearing the same mark together.336  
Coexistence agreements337 are likewise entered into to settle trademark 
disputes.  The parties to such agreements essentially agree not to sue each 
other as long as each does not overstep the boundaries of his product 
area.338  A coexistence agreement is neither an assignment nor a license.  It 
is a recognition that a concurrent use of the mark by both parties is not 
likely to cause confusion because of the differences in their goods.339  That 
is, parties recognize that their marks can coexist peacefully.  Thus, while a 
license integrates, a coexistence agreement differentiates.340 
Theoretically, these two types of agreements are designed for mutually 
exclusive situations.  When consumer confusion is likely, only assignment 
and license-back agreement may be employed.341  A coexistence agreement 
is inappropriate in such situations: parties cannot conspire to confuse the 
consumer.  In theory, coexistence agreements made under such 
circumstances should be held void.342  In practice, however, the choice 
between these two types of agreements is essentially at the parties’ 
discretion.  For example, in a dispute between a winery and a salami 
manufacturer, both using the mark “Gallo,” the winery acquired the mark 
from the salami manufacturer, and subsequently licensed the mark back to 
the same manufacturer.343  By contrast, when one party was using the 
trademark “Sunkist” on citrus fruit, and the other was using the mark “Sun-
Kist” on canned fruit and vegetables, the parties decided to enter a 
coexistence agreement.344  The fact that, practically speaking, trademark 
owners can choose between these two types of agreements is also evident 
from the legal literature, where trademark owners are advised to opt for a 
coexistence agreement if they wish to escape tort liability.345 
Assignment and license-back agreements often result in nominal 
                                                                                                                          
336 See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1824, 1831 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“That the transfer of the GALLO SALAME mark served the goal of minimizing consumer 
confusion becomes most clear when we view the assignment/lease-back transaction as a whole.”); 
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:9 (describing the Gallo wine case to exemplify the usefulness of 
assignment and license-back in settling litigation disputes). 
337 Coexistence agreements are also called “consent to use agreements.” 
338 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 18:79. 
339 Id. 
340 Id. 
341 Id. 
342 Id. 
343 E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1824, 1831 (9th Cir. 1992). 
344 Cal. Fruit Growers Exch. v. Sunkist Baking Co., 166 F.2d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 1947) (dismissing 
complaint for unfair competition and infringement of trademarks). 
345 Mary Hutchings Reed, Trademarks in the Sale of Part of a Business: Concurrent Use and 
Licensing, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 514, 536 (1990) (“[C]oncurrent use agreement is preferable, 
particularly because it avoids the product liability pitfalls inherent in licensing agreements.”). 
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control by the stronger company over the weaker one.346  Often, the 
licensor does not exercise any meaningful quality control, so each party 
continues to manufacture its goods as it did prior to the agreement.347  The 
common trademark in such cases is merely a legal fiction, allowing one 
party to charge the other for royalties, while in reality there are two 
trademark users before and after the agreement.  On the other hand, 
coexistence agreements often represent mutual consent, motivated by 
business considerations, to use trademarks on closely related goods 
notwithstanding the likelihood of consumer confusion.  There is even some 
evidence that such agreements include payment of fees,348 although this 
does not make sense when the parties recognize that no one infringes on 
the other’s rights.  
Meanwhile, courts are extremely reluctant to establish a likelihood of 
confusion that would render a coexistence agreement invalid.349  The 
general rule is that the public interest in preventing confusion must be 
balanced against the public interest in contract enforcement.350  This latter 
interest is given great weight.  Even when consumer confusion is found, 
coexistence agreements are upheld, unless the public is substantially 
harmed.351  For instance, in one case, the court upheld a coexistence 
agreement allowing one party to use the trademark “Field and Stream” for 
a hunting and fishing magazine, while allowing another party to use the 
same mark for clothing, including fishing and hunting clothing.352 
Note that in conflicts over trademark rights, confusion is found even 
when the goods of the parties operate in somewhat more distant fields.  
Thus, the magazine trademarks “Esquire,” “Seventeen,” “Playboy,” and 
“Vogue” were protected from unauthorized uses on slippers, luggage, 
                                                                                                                          
346 See Calboli, supra note 157, at 384–85 (describing the primary purpose of assignment and 
license-back agreements as acquiring control of the assigned mark). 
347 Id. (“[A]ssignors/licensees enter these transactions primarily to avoid a finding of trademark 
infringement and to continue using the mark at issue for the same products as prior to the signing of the 
agreement . . . .”). 
348 Ron Cauldwell Jewelry Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes Inc., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2009, 2012 
(T.T.A.B. 2002) (“Despite opposer’s arguments to the contrary, the record is devoid of any evidence 
which raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the coexistence agreement . . . lacks 
consideration . . . .”). 
349 See, e.g., Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Field & Stream Licenses Co., 294 F.3d 383, 396 (2d 
Cir. 2002); Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. Bankcard Holders of Am., 784 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1986);   
T & T Mfg. Co. v. A. T. Cross Co., 587 F.2d 533, 539 (1st Cir. 1978). 
350 T & T Mfg., 587 F.2d at 539 (discussing the public interest in avoiding confusion and the 
policy of deference to contractual agreements). 
351 Times Mirror Magazines, 294 F.3d at 396 (“In the absence of significant harm to the public, 
the district court correctly declined to don the mantle of public interest to save plaintiff from a harm 
that is permitted by the contract.”).   
352 Id. at 391 (“We conclude . . . that the rights of the parties to use the mark in connection with 
the goods at issue in this lawsuit are defined by the agreements rather than by any residual trademark 
right.”). 
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automotive supplies, and hats respectively.353  One might wonder, what 
does it matter from the consumer’s perspective when the trademark owner 
consents to the concurrent use?  
We can observe that courts tend to regard trademark rights in collateral 
markets as pure property rights, shaped by private interests and agreements 
rather than the consumer’s perception.  The trademark owner is regarded as 
someone having priority rights over the trademark in collateral markets. 354  
If he chooses to enter a certain collateral market himself, or simply to 
assert his rights when someone else is trying to enter this market, the 
trademark rights in this market will belong to him.  If, however, the 
trademark owner consents to the concurrent use by a junior user in a 
collateral market, or if he does not sue the junior user in time, such user 
will acquire trademark rights in the collateral market. 
All this illustrates that in the context of collateral markets, courts 
implicitly doubt the usefulness of the maxim that trademark rights should 
be determined based on the question of consumer confusion.  While I share 
this view, I believe that it should not lead us to conclude that trademark 
rights should be determined on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the 
interests and the behavior of the specific trademark owners and other 
private parties.  This conception of trademarks as pure private property 
should be rejected.  Instead, consumer perception should be the only basis 
for trademark protection.  
To quote the 1928 Yale decision once again, “a merchant may have a 
sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his 
own exploitation . . . .  His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for 
the goods which bear it . . . .”355  This is the correct understanding of the 
concept of a trademark.  A trademark should be protected only so far as the 
consumer perceives it as the authentic seal of its owner. 
The perception of a mark as an authentic seal does not change as 
rapidly as the perception of a mark as a symbol of some ephemeral 
connection to its owner.  While consumers can easily be convinced to 
assume that trademark owners require authorization for virtually every use 
of their marks, they will not be so quick to assume that trademark owners 
actually vouch for the goods that bear their marks.  Indeed, while today’s 
consumers expect virtually every use of a famous trademark to be 
                                                                                                                          
353 Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d 540, 546 (1st Cir. 1957); Vogue Co. v. 
Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924); HMH Publ’g Co. v. Brincat, 342 F. Supp. 
1275, 1281–82 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Standard Plastic Prods., Inc., 241 F. Supp. 
613, 621 (E.D. Pa. 1965).  For additional examples, see MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 24:61. 
354 There is a general tendency in trademark law to view trademarks as broad property rights.  For 
a review and critique of this tendency, see Assaf, supra note 8, at 74–82 (outlining the property rhetoric 
of trademark law); Johnston, supra note 156, at 22–29 (describing the changing form of licensing 
trademarks throughout time); Lemley, supra note 140, at 1693–94 (addressing the “increasing tendency 
to treat trademarks as assets with their own intrinsic value”). 
355 Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928). 
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authorized,356 they do not expect the trademark owner to exercise quality 
control while licensing into collateral markets.357 
It should therefore be decided that trademarks are not to be protected in 
collateral markets, in principle.  A corresponding consumer perception will 
follow.  If the consumer is not substantially damaged by “Field and 
Stream” hunting clothes, produced without the authorization of the Field 
and Stream hunting magazine publisher, she will similarly not be damaged 
by unauthorized Playboy automotive supplies.  If the consumer can adjust 
to “Tiffan E” for cosmetics, she can also get accustomed to “Classic 
Tiffany” for automobiles.  
4.  An Intermediate Conclusion: Collateral Markets and Brand 
Fetishism 
To achieve the result of denying trademark protection in collateral 
markets, two rules should be adopted.  First, trademark licenses in 
collateral markets should be deemed void due to the licensor’s inability to 
exercise meaningful quality control.  Second, unauthorized trademark uses 
in collateral markets should neither be enjoined as trademark infringement 
nor as dilution.  By adopting these two rules, brand fetishism will abate, in 
at least three ways.  
First, the mere fact that brand extensions into collateral markets will be 
impossible will undermine the incentive to invest in brand personalities.  
As discussed above, functional, product-related trademarks are less 
profitable today, for they are less extendible into other product areas.358   If 
collateral markets cease to represent a profit potential, trademarks 
conveying spirit and soul will become somewhat less profitable.  
Consequently, the incentives to create trademarks conveying skill and 
expertise will increase. 
Second, as noted above, brand extensions into dissimilar product areas 
are an indispensable part of brand fetishism.  They disconnect the brand 
from physical products, demonstrating that it conveys a larger concept and 
can operate as an independent entity.359  In other words, the fact that 
entirely different skills are necessary in order to manufacture cars and 
perfume or motorbikes and sunglasses encourages the consumer to 
perceive Jaguar and Harley-Davidson brands as much broader concepts 
than simply “authentic seals,” that is, as signifying origins of product 
manufacture or quality control. 
Trademark law should begin to recognize its role as a creator of 
                                                                                                                          
356 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 10:43. 
357 Franklyn, Apparent Manufacturer, supra note 154, at 691 (noting that, especially within 
collateral licensing context, consumers do not assume a trademark “signifies that the trademark owner 
made the product or that it is the source of quality control standards”). 
358 See supra Part II.D. 
359 Id. 
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consumer perceptions, and act accordingly.  Over the years, by providing 
legal support for most remote brand extensions, trademark law has taught 
the consumer to perceive brands as independent entities, thereby endorsing 
brand fetishism.  If trademark protection in collateral markets is now 
denied, the consumer perception will consequently change.  If each 
trademark is restricted to a certain product context, branded products will 
be seen as simple “commodities” rather than as entities with personality 
and soul.  This would undermine brand fetishism. 
Third, as discussed in Part II.D, the most important factor for a 
successful brand extension is the compatibility of the extension with the 
brand’s concept.360  Much in the same manner, unauthorized uses of a 
trademark on products incompatible with its image may rupture the 
coherence of the brand’s concept.  Many courts regard the need to prevent 
this damage as the main justification for protection against dilution.361  
Real as it may be, this damage should not be prevented.  On the contrary, 
allowing famous trademarks to be used in collateral markets would weaken 
brand fetishism. If consumers constantly encounter “Rolls Royce” 
insecticide, “Chanel” floor wax, and the like, the idolized status of brands 
will probably be somewhat shaken. 
C.  Merchandising Markets 
A trademark’s “merchandising market” includes the sale of brand 
paraphernalia, such as T-shirts, cups, or posters displaying the mark.  Such 
goods are normally purchased by consumers wishing to express their 
loyalty to the mark. 
For a long time, merchandising goods displaying famous trademarks 
were sold without licenses from trademark owners.362  As corporations 
began building up brands with personalities and souls in the 1980s,363 they 
also began to understand the enormous potential profit from selling brand 
merchandise.  As a result, corporations started claiming exclusive rights 
over the merchandising markets of their brands.364  
The courts’ reactions to these new claims varied.  Some courts found 
                                                                                                                          
360 Id. 
361 See, e.g., Ameritech, Inc. v. Am. Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 965 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating 
that dilution “corrodes the senior user’s interest in the trademark by blurring its product identification 
or by damaging positive associations that have attached to it”); Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 
699 F.2d 621, 624–25 (2d Cir. 1983) (“The interest protected . . . is not simply commercial goodwill, 
but the selling power that a distinctive mark or name with favorable associations has engendered for a 
product in the mind of the consuming public.”); Tiffany & Co. v. Bos. Club, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 836, 
844 (D. Mass. 1964) (“The risk of detraction may be a risk of an erosion of the public’s identification 
of this very strong mark with the plaintiff alone, thus diminishing its distinctiveness, uniqueness, 
effectiveness, and prestigious connotations . . . .”). 
362 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 472; Johnston, supra note 156, at 30. 
363 See supra Part II.B. 
364 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 472–73; Johnston, supra note 156, at 29–30.  
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that consumers who buy merchandising goods only wish to express their 
identification with the trademark owner.  Such consumers do not 
reasonably expect that all merchandise bearing the trademark has 
necessarily been licensed by its owner.365  Besides, the consumers are 
usually indifferent to the question of whether such a license exists and 
thus, cannot be confused.366  Other courts, however, held that trademark 
owners should have exclusive rights over merchandising markets, but 
could not articulate such a right using the traditional tools of trademark 
law.367 
In Boston Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem 
Manufacturing, Inc.,368 the concept of trademark infringement was 
substantially broadened so as to embrace the merchandising market.  The 
court stated that the confusion requirement is met by the mere fact that the 
consumer identifies the symbols appearing on the sold merchandise as 
symbols originating from the trademark owner.369  The argument that there 
must be confusion as to the manufacturer of the goods was found 
unpersuasive where the trademark was the “triggering mechanism for the 
sale” of the goods.370  Although this decision was subjected to harsh 
criticism in legal practice371 and scholarly literature,372 courts have 
increasingly accepted its conclusions.  Over the course of time, the right of 
trademark owners over merchandising markets came to be taken for 
granted.373 
Today, such a far-reaching interpretation of the concept of consumer 
                                                                                                                          
365 E.g., Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079, 
1083 (5th Cir. 1982); Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 920 (9th Cir. 
1980); Bd. of Governors of the Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 172–73 (M.D.N.C. 
1989). 
366 Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. at 173. 
367 E.g., Bos. Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1989); Univ. of Ga. Athletic Ass’n 
v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 
1983); Bos. Professional Hockey Ass’n v. Dall. Cap & Emblem Mfg, Inc,, 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
368 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975). 
369 Id. at 1012. 
370 Id. 
371 Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The 
Boston Hockey decision transmogrifies th[e] narrow [trademark] protection into a broad monopoly.”); 
Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Henry Regnery Co., 421 F. Supp. 359, 362 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (“[A] broad reading 
of the Boston Pro Hockey decision would have the effect of changing the focus of the trademark laws 
from the protection of the public to the protection of the trademark owner’s business interest.”).  
372 See, e.g., Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the 
Emerging Rationales for the Protection of the Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 168; W.J. 
Keating, Patches on the Trademark Law, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 315, 315–17 (1977); Charles A. Laff & 
Larry L. Saret, Further Unraveling of Sears-Compco: Of Patches, Paladin and Laurel and Hardy, 66 
TRADEMARK REP. 427, 443–45 (1976). 
373 See, e.g., Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2006); Gen. Motors Corp. v. 
Lanard Toys, Inc., 468 F.3d 405, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2006); Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of 
Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2006); Tex. Tech Univ. v. Spiegelberg, 461 F. Supp. 2d 
510, 520 (N.D. Tex. 2006). 
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confusion as employed in Boston Professional Hockey is no longer 
necessary.  By consistently enjoining unauthorized merchandising 
products, courts have effectively influenced consumer perception.  
Empirical data suggests that today a large majority of the public believes 
that authorization is needed to display a trademark on merchandising 
products.374 
Obviously, a trademark does not play any informative function when 
displayed on merchandising goods.  The legal literature recognizes that 
consumers of brand merchandise are not motivated by assumptions about 
the quality of products, but by the desire to express loyalty, admiration, or 
sympathy with the trademark owner.375  There is no substantial product 
behind the trademark—the trademark itself is the product desired by the 
consumer.376  Consumers do not believe that the trademark owner produces 
merchandising products or controls their quality.377  Accordingly, scholars 
strongly advocate a complete abandonment of the quality control 
requirement,378 and an absolute exemption from tort liability for trademark 
licensors379 in the context of merchandising. 
Consumer confusion in the context of merchandising is essentially 
confined to the question whether the consumer thinks that it is legal to 
display one’s trademark on merchandising products without obtaining a 
license and paying a fee.  Meanwhile, many consumers are indifferent as to 
whether such license exists.380  For those who are not, prominent 
disclaimers would be an easy solution.381 
All this demonstrates that consumer confusion is a shaky rationale for 
providing trademark rights over merchandising markets.  A number of 
                                                                                                                          
374 In 1983, a survey showed that 91.2% of the people interviewed thought that an owner of a 
name or character had to give permission before a product could bear its name.  MCCARTHY, supra 
note 31, § 24:12. 
375 This is known as the so-called “‘LAS’ factor.”  Keating, supra note 173, at 372; Parks, supra 
note 172, at 544; Kuss, supra note 163, at 376. 
376 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 463 & n.9, 472; Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 961 (1993). 
377 Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods. Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1047 (3d Cir. 1982) (“No one 
would seriously assert that a significant segment of the public believes that Pitt actually manufactured 
the goods involved.”); Keating, supra note 173, at 372. 
378 Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 46; Keating, supra note 173, at 378; Marks, supra note 
302, at 648–50; Parks, supra note 172, at 544–45. 
379 Franklyn, Licensors, supra note 155, at 47.  
380 Bd. of Governors of Univ. of N.C. v. Helpingstine, 714 F. Supp. 167, 173 (M.D.N.C. 1989) 
(“[T]he court is skeptical that those individuals who purchase unlicensed tee-shirts bearing [University 
of North Carolina] marks care one way or the other whether the University sponsors or endorses such 
products or whether the products are officially licensed.”); Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and 
Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2154 (2004); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 488; C. 
Knox Withers, Sine Qua Non: Trademark Infringement, Likelihood of Confusion, and the Business of 
Collegiate Licensing, 11 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 421, 454 (2004). 
381 Bone, supra note 380, at 2181–85; Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 488–89; Withers, 
supra note 380, at 454. 
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legal scholars recognize this point.382  Some conclude that confusion 
should no longer be required; displaying another’s trademark on 
merchandising goods should be regarded as an unjustified 
misappropriation of another’s property.383  Others suggest denying 
trademark protection in this field.384  Opening merchandising markets to 
competition would reduce prices and enhance quality, they argue.385  
Trademark protection in merchandising markets constitutes the most 
explicit legal encouragement of brand fetishism.  As discussed in Part II.E, 
displaying brand merchandise is an essentially ritualistic behavior.386  A 
consumer wearing a brand T-shirt or hanging a brand poster on his 
bedroom wall is the ultimate “committed customer,” who has fully 
internalized the idea that the brand is an independent spiritual being, which 
can be liberated from any connection with material goods.  Brand 
merchandise evokes the brand’s spirit, devoid of any product-related 
substance.387 
The merchandising right is the ultimate right in the trademarked 
symbol itself, in the trademark as a spiritual being, and as a subject of 
devotion and worship.  If trademark law allows trademark owners to profit 
from the exploitation of the purely symbolic dimensions of their marks, it 
eventually encourages them to create these dimensions.  This incentive is 
not negligible: the legendary Hard Rock Café, for instance, garners much 
more profit from merchandising than from its core restaurant services.388  If 
we believe that brand fetishism should be discouraged, this provides a 
convincing reason to deny trademark protection in merchandising markets. 
                                                                                                                          
382 Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights, supra note 327, at 614–15 (“In the context of 
ornamental trademark use . . . an untempered fixation with confusion has often obscured more 
fundamental issues.”); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 488–89 (“[T]he fact that consumers may 
believe trademark owners have a right to control merchandise bearing their brands does not itself 
justify a merchandising right.”). 
383 Denicola, Institutional Publicity Rights, supra note 327, at 637–41 (suggesting shaping the 
merchandising right as a property right akin to copyright); Keating, supra note 173, at 372 (“If . . . the 
court perceives that consumers purchase goods to display their loyalty and support of the trademark’s 
owner . . . then use of the mark by an interloper should be treated as unjustified misappropriation of 
personal property . . . .”). 
384 Bone, supra note 380, at 2181–85 (suggesting that in merchandising cases the relief should be 
limited to a disclaimer remedy); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 488–89 (asserting that since 
consumers do not care whether merchandising products are officially licensed, the competitive process 
does not suffer from a mistaken assumption that the use required a license); Withers, supra note 380, at 
455–56 (“The seller of an unlicensed product who makes no claim that the item is ‘official’ . . . should 
not be enjoined from an otherwise legal activity.”). 
385 Dogan & Lemley, supra note 138, at 481. 
386 See supra Part II.E. 
387 Id. 
388 KUNDE, supra note 14, at 93–94. 
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V.  ARE THERE ALTERNATIVE RATIONALES FOR SUPPORTING BRAND 
FETISHISM? 
As demonstrated in the previous section, trademark law today 
essentially supports and encourages brand fetishism, although its 
traditional rationales speak in favor of discouraging this practice.  This 
section examines whether there are alternative rationales for supporting 
brand fetishism and sustaining the legal doctrines facilitating this fetishism. 
The U.S. legal system presumes liberty as a starting point.  Legal 
protection restricts liberty and therefore, requires justification.  
Specifically, legal protection of trademarks restricts the liberty of others to 
use trademarks.  Traditionally, this restriction was justified by the need to 
encourage trademark owners to invest in the quality of their goods,389 
thereby mitigating the risk of the market failure known as “the market for 
lemons.”390  This justification holds only as long as trademark protection is 
limited to the informational function of the mark.  When one wishes to 
protect additional trademark dimensions, alternative rationales are needed 
to justify the respective additional restrictions on liberty.  In other words, 
we must examine whether the spiritual dimensions of brands serve any 
important social purposes that could justify their protection. 
While consumers who misjudge product quality because of emotional 
attachments to the brand present a clear case for discouraging brand 
fetishism, some consumers quite intentionally purchase the symbolic 
dimensions of brands.  These consumers can be roughly divided into two 
groups: (1) those who wish to communicate their social status, group 
identification, etc. through brands; and (2) those who use brands to satisfy 
their spiritual needs for community, religion, or ideology.  Accordingly, 
our primary question as to whether alternative rationales for protection of 
brand personalities exist may be similarly broken down: (1) whether 
brands should be protected as tools of personal communication; and (2) 
whether brands should be protected as sources of ideology, community, 
and religion.  
A.  Should Brands Be Protected as Tools of Personal Communication?  
Should trademark law help trademark owners provide consumers with 
efficient means of personal communication?  If there is a consumer 
                                                                                                                          
389 MCCARTHY, supra note 31, §§ 2:3–4. 
390 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490–92 (1970).  The article describes the market failure caused by 
information asymmetry, giving as an example the market for used cars, in which consumers cannot 
estimate the quality of the cars and therefore, are unwilling to pay higher prices for high-quality cars.  
The owners of high quality cars will be unwilling to place their cars in such a market and thus, the 
market will consist only of defective cars—“lemons.”  Trademarks are designed to serve as quality 
signals and to solve this type of market failure. 
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demand for brands as personal communication tools, why should this not 
serve as a sufficient rationale for encouraging the market to supply such 
tools?  
As already discussed in the context of post-sale confusion, there is also 
a sufficient demand for imitations of branded products.391  That is, while 
some consumers wish to use brands as truthful means of communication, 
others wish to wield them dishonestly.  Protecting trademarks as 
communication tools results in privileging the former group over the latter.  
However, there is no good reason for doing so.  Both groups have 
legitimate interests in the market of personal transactions. 
The problem of emulation of communicative tools in the market of 
personal transactions is an old one,392 and over time this market has 
developed efficient tools to communicate one’s social status: education, 
taste, knowledge, etc.393  When brands are legally protected as means of 
personal communication, this encourages “branded,” materialistic channels 
of personal transactions.  Viewed more broadly, this protection serves to 
make material goals more socially significant and hence encourage 
individuals to strive for these goals rather than for other goals.  Thus, the 
legal protection currently provided by trademark law may be one reason 
for the increasing presence of “branded” personal communication, and for 
the heightened materialism of modern western culture. 
The legal system should generally refrain from exerting cultural 
influence by providing individuals with certain types of communication 
channels.  In addition, there are good reasons not to encourage materialistic 
communication and materialistic culture in particular.  In his famous book 
The High Price of Materialism, Tim Kasser describes a comprehensive 
empirical study on materialistic values, which shows that when personal 
interactions are based on materialistic values, less empathy and intimacy 
are present in relationships.394  Kasser’s research also demonstrates that 
materialistic values undermine individuals’ physical well-being and 
psychological health.395  “To the extent we can break . . . some of the 
vicious cycles brought about by a focus on materialism, we will be able to 
improve the quality of life for ourselves, our families [and] our 
communities,” Kasser concludes.396  In protecting trademarks as tools of 
personal communication, trademark law pushes us in the opposite 
direction.  
                                                                                                                          
391 See supra Part IV.A.4.  
392 See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text (providing the example of lace). 
393 This argument is extensively developed in PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL 
CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE (Richard Nice trans., 1984). 
394 TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM 87–95 (2002). 
395 Id. at 5–22. 
396 Id. at 115. 
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B.  Should Brands Be Protected as Sources of Ideology, Community, and 
Religion? 
Consumers who engage in brand cults, form brand communities, and 
buy brand merchandise explicitly recognize brands as spiritual beings, as 
sources of community, ideology, and religion.  Some scholars argue that as 
community, ideology, and religion decline, brands legitimately fill the void 
left by these institutions.397  In fact, marketing experts intentionally target 
these goals.  For instance, Douglas B. Holt argues that identity brands 
compete in myth markets, not in product markets.398  He suggests that to 
achieve an iconic status, the brand should be imbued with myths that play 
upon cultural tensions.399  In his book The Culting of Brands: When 
Customers Become True Believers, Douglas Atkin writes: “Belonging is a 
fundamental dictate of the human condition . . . . Not to provide 
communities is not to satisfy a basic need.  And not satisfying a basic need 
with a commercial answer would be the shame of most business people.”400  
Later he adds: “The craving need to make meaning is part of the human 
condition.  And again, if you don’t satisfy a craving need with a 
commercial answer, you should be thrown into the business hall of 
infamy.”401  
Legally protecting brand personalities implicitly lends approval to this 
approach.  I believe this is undesirable.  The fact that people today have a 
certain deficit of community, ideology, and religion does not mean that 
these needs should be fulfilled by commercial channels; it certainly does 
not mean that the law should actively facilitate this process.  People may 
participate in the cults of brand fetishism, but that does not mean that they 
crave spiritual satisfaction in the form of brands. 
In a similar vein, Kalle Lasn writes: “The commercial mass media is 
rearranging our neurons, manipulating our emotions, making powerful new 
connections between deep immaterial needs and material products.”402  
This description makes a valuable point: brand fetishism does not originate 
with private people.  It is created and maintained by the marketing 
activities of commercial corporations.  William Leach likewise argues that 
consumer culture is one of the most nonconsensual public cultures ever 
                                                                                                                          
397 ATKIN, supra note 55, at 201–02 (“We’ve reached a unique intersection in society that favors 
marketers.  On one side, established [social, religious, and political] institutions are proving to be 
increasingly inadequate sources of meaning and community.  On the other, [m]arketing is reaching its 
maturity in terms of shrewdness and artfulness.” (citations omitted)); Muñiz & O’Guinn, supra note 58, 
at 428 (“If it is true that modernity has brought with it . . . ‘the disenchantment of the world,’ is it 
possible that community could coalesce around brands of things, to satisfy . . . a yearning for a 
‘reconstructed and re-mystified community?’  We believe so.” (citations omitted)). 
398 HOLT, supra note 53, at 39. 
399 Id. at 39 et seq.  
400 ATKIN, supra note 55, at 58. 
401 Id. at 96.  
402 LASN, supra note 36, at 12. 
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created, since it has not been produced “by people” but by profit-seeking 
commercial entities.403 
To a certain extent, it can be said that brand fetishism currently 
competes in the “market” for religions and ideologies.  It vigorously 
competes for the right to occupy the spiritual spaces of our society.  A 
modern western citizen is inundated with messages trying to convince her 
that spiritual needs can be satisfied by commercial brands.  As Leach puts 
it, commercial culture raises to the fore only one vision of the good life, 
pushing out all others.404  We are much more often persuaded that brands 
will bring us happiness than that a certain religion or worldview will do the 
same—for devotion to a brand brings much more economic gain than any 
other type of devotion.  Consequently, the incentive to promote brand 
fetishism is much greater than the incentive to promote any other ideology 
or religion.  
By supporting brand fetishism, the legal system facilitates and 
promotes its role in the spiritual sphere.  Yet there are valid reasons to keep 
commercial and spiritual spheres apart, or at the least not to encourage 
their fusion through legal rules.  These two realms do—and should—
function differently in many respects.  For instance, the spiritual realm is 
not directly motivated by the desire for economic revenues gained from 
followers to the same extent as is the commercial market.  In the spiritual 
sphere, preachers are usually true believers, while in the commercial 
world, “preachers” tend to be professionals in techniques of psychological 
influence. 
If trademark protection is constrained to the informational function of 
the mark, there will be much less of an incentive for corporations to strive 
to satisfy our spiritual needs with commercial brands.  And when brands 
retreat from the spiritual spaces of our society, alternative, non-
consumerist visions of the good life will have a fair chance of rising to the 
fore.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
“The protection of trade-marks is the law’s recognition of the 
psychological function of symbols.”405  
This observation, made by Justice Frankfurter in 1942, is more 
accurate today.  In a market saturated with material goods, the emotional 
dimensions of products, as embodied in their trademarks, are becoming 
ever more important. 
This Article has focused on brand fetishism, the tendency of modern 
                                                                                                                          
403 WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS, POWER, AND THE RISE OF A NEW AMERICAN 
CULTURE xv (1993). 
404 Id.  
405 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942). 
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corporations to shape trademarks as independent spiritual entities, rather 
than as mere designations of origin.  It has demonstrated that trademark 
law assists corporations in achieving this goal.  Trademark law plays a 
central role in creating and maintaining consumer perceptions about 
trademarks.  The choice as to which psychological functions of trademarks 
will enjoy protection lies within the purview of the legal system.  This 
choice should be made with great care.  The legal system should refrain 
from supporting ungrounded beliefs about trademarks. 
The primary function of trademarks is to identify the trademark owner 
as the source of goods.  As long as trademark law protects this 
psychological function of trademarks, it is supported by firm economic 
justifications.  By contrast, the perception of trademarks as entities with 
personalities and souls deserves no legal protection.  Trademark elements 
designed to influence the consumer on the emotional 
level should be left outside the area protected by trademark law.  Yet, as 
this Article has pointed out, these functions currently do enjoy extensive 
legal protection.  For instance, trademark owners are allowed to license 
their marks to third parties, refrain from being involved in the 
manufacturing process of the licensees, and later assume no liability for 
low-quality and defective products bearing their marks.  This legal 
situation allows trademark owners to exploit their marks as mere 
psychological stimuli rather than as designations of origin. 
Not every commercial trend should be encouraged by the legal system.  
Trademark law should cease to endorse the trend toward brand fetishism.  
It should actively create and shape consumer perceptions and business 
norms.  It should take steps to demystify brands and to restore the 
trademark’s primary function—as an indicator of origin and quality of 
goods.  While corporations may sometimes wish to elevate the trademark 
over the product—the form over the substance—such efforts should enjoy 
no legal support.  A trademark should be legally protected only as a name, 
not as a rose. 
 
